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FTC RULEMAKING THROUGH NEGOTIATION
CHARLEs

H. KOCH, JR.t

AND BETH MARTIN*

The FederalTrade Commission, along with other administrative
agencies, has been especially affectedby the current emphasis on deregulation. Some proponentsof thefree market system view the Commission as an unnecessary and costly impediment to marketfanctioning.
In this article,ProfessorKoch andMs. Martin reviewpastFTCregulatory efforts in light of the FTC'smandate:to maintain an efficient, competitivefree market Although the FTC has deviatedfrom its market
maintenance goal, this deviation should not serve as a basisfor constricting Commission rulemaking activity. Rather, the authorsdemonstrate thatpast Commissionpracticesillustratethe needfor an informal
rulemakingprocedure that is sensitive to the needs of both consumers
and industry.
Throughout the political spectrum, the nation's policymakers are espousing a newfound devotion to deregulation. Numerous policy arguments have
been advanced to support a decrease in government involvement in social and
economic activities, but the driving force behind deregulation has been the
growing political power of business interests. This power derives less from the
traditional authority accruing to wealth than from a revitalized doctrine that
commerce best serves the greater interests of society. Emerging in the decade
of the Seventies was a reaffirmation of Coolidge's observation: "The business
of America is business."
A corollary of this doctrine is the acceptance of the existence of social and
economic winners and losers. Because our democratic, capitalistic system requires rewards and losses, its adherents distrust any institution that insulates a
major part of society from the risk of loss. One regulatory institution perceived as interfering with these natural processes is the Federal Trade Commission. Contrary to this perception, the motivation behind the creation of the
FTC was a desire to protect economic processes from various anticompetitive
practices; only later was the FTC permitted to police anticonsumer practices.'
t Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary; B.A.
1966, University of Maryland; J.D. 1969, George Washington University; L.L.M. 1975, University
of Chicago.
* Clerk to Judge Tom Cauthorn, State Court of Cobb County, Marietta, Georgia; B.A.
1978, State University of New York at Albany; J.D. 1981, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College
of William and Mary.
1. The legislative history is extensive: Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717
(1914); as amendedby ch. 49, § 1107, 52 Stat. 111 (1938); as amended by ch. 601, sec. 1107, § 5(a),
52 Stat. 1026, 1028 (1938); as amended by ch. 61, sec. 4, §§ 5, 15, 64 Stat. 20, 21-22 (1950); as
amended by ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631 (1952); as amended by Pub. L. No. 85-726, sec. 414, §1, 72 Stat.
731, 770 (1958); as amended by Pub. L. No. 85-791, sec. 3-4, §§ 5(b), 5(c), 11, 72 Stat. 941, 942-43
(1958); as amended by Pub. L. No. 86-507, sec. 13, § 5(0, 74 Stat. 200 (1960); as amended by Pub.
L. No. 93-153, sec. 408, §§ 5(1), 6, 13, 16, 87 Stat. 576, 591-92 (1973); as amended by Pub. L. No.
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The regulatory mandate of the FTC does not require that it replace market
resource allocation decisionmaking with government decisionmaking. Rather,
the FTC's function is to maintain market machinery so that the market, not
the government, allocates resources in the best interests of the entire
population.
The FTC performs this function in two ways. First, it must assure continued competition in the marketplace, because only a competitive market allows
proper economic functioning. 2 Second, it must strive to encourage confidence
3
in the marketplace among the ultimate economic decisionmakers, consumers.
The FTC's consumer protection function is as much a market maintenance
activity as is its antitrust function. Regulation for the protection of the consumer is intended neither to substitute government decisions for the marketplace choices nor to insulate consumers in the marketplace from the risk of
loss. In performing its market maintenance function the FTC does, of course,
lower the risk to consumers in dealing in the marketplace. The risk reduction,
however, is aimed at eliminating fears that would deter consumers from entering the marketplace, rather than affecting consumer behavior thereafter.
If the FTC is performing its function properly, honest commercial interests should be as supportative of the FTC's activities as are consumer interests.
The FTC should assist in creating a market enviroment in which consumers
and honest commercial entities can trade efficiently to their mutual benefit.
There is strong evidence, however, that neither commercial interests nor consumers interests are content with the way the FTC currently regulates the
marketplace. To a large extent, such dissatisfaction is intrinsic to the FTC's
performance of its policing function; no one particularly likes the police even
though in the abstract we recognize that they exist for our benefit. Dissatisfaction also emanates from the ambiguous mandate given the FTC by Congress. 4 Moreover, the FTC carries a subtle public image burden: consumer
interests want the FTC to protect not only the marketplace but also the losers;
business interests see only the short-range costs of market maintenance regulation instead of the long-range benefits of market maintenance regulation.
The vigor of recent criticism surpasses predictable objections and suggests that an actual breakdown in performance has occurred. Dissatisfaction
with the FTC, especially within the business community, has reached a level
that raises concern as to whether the agency is properly performing its func93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975); as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-145, sec. 3, § 5(a), 89 Stat. 801 (1975);
as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-37, 93 Stat. 95 (1979); as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat.
374 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-57 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
2. H.R. REP. No. 533, Part 2, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).

3. The FTC authority over consumer protection was affirmed by the Wheeler-Lea amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1938. It declared unlawful "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices." Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. I11. See supra note 1.

4. J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 100-03 (1978). Freedman cites several factors
that combine to produce an ambiguous mandate: "the FTC deals with an unmanageably broad

spectrum of economic activity, usually has not had strong support from either the industries it
regulates or the Congress, has been hampered by inadequate enforcement authority and insufficient funding, and has been less successful... [than other agencies] in attracting well qualified
personnel." Id. at 103.
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tion. The FTC's mandate requires sensitivity to the objectives of commercial
interests because attention to these objectives reveals the proper scope of gov-

ernment efforts to enhance market functioning. The heated criticism the
agency has suffered from business interests highlights the failure of the agency

to implement its market maintenance function properly. The past FTC administration ignored these criticisms; the present FTC administration appar5
ently is committed to the elimination of the FTC's role in the economy.
These approaches are neither productive nor realistic. Whatever the wisdom
of deregulation in other areas, stifing the FTC is not deregulation in its true

sense. Rather, it represents an attack on governmental efforts that seek to as-

sure an efficient market system. The issue is not a market economy versus a
regulated economy, but whether the FTC is properly performing its market
policing function. 6 The way to answer the agency's critics is to assure that the
FTC successfully furthers its market maintenance functions.
The FTC's original mandate was to enhance the operation of the market-

place by policing unfair methods of competition. 7 Mr. Brandeis, then advisor
to President Wilson, insisted on creating an agency to eliminate unfair methods of competition rather than relying on machinery dependent upon judicial
enforcement for its effect. 8 He successfully argued against Wilson's own idea
of delineating a laundry list of prohibited unfair methods of competition-

some of which survived as set forth in the Clayton Act 9 -by convincing Wl-

son and Congress that business interests would find ways around even the
most complete list of anticompetitive practices. 1° Thus, it is fundamental to
5. For example, legislative cutbacks of the FTC are now under way in Congress. In May
1982, the Senate Commerce Committee voted to exempt professional associations from FTC antitrust scrutiny, to prohibit FTC challenges to commercial advertising under the unfairness doctrine, and warned the FTC to avoid regulation of agricultural cooperatives. The Senate
Commerce Committee also voted to continue the legislative veto power over FTC rules and to
require the FTC to demonstrate that a practice is "prevalent" within an industry before adopting a
Trade Regulation Rule. Senate Commerce CommitteeApproves Exemptionsfrom FTCJurisdiction
for Professionals,Advertisers, 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1064, at 1023 (May

13, 1982).
The agency is also threatened with continued staff reductions. On April 16, 1982, the FTC
announced that it would close four of its ten regional offices in an effort to reduce agency costs.
FITC Decides to Close Its Four Regional Offices in Los Angeles, Seattle, Denver and Boston, '42
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1061, at 807 (April 22, 1982). The four-office shutdown, which was scheduled to occur on July 15, 1982, however, never took place. On May 28,
1982, the four offices were notified that plans to eliminate the offices had been suspended pending
further study. FTC Suspends Its Proposalto Close FourRegional Offices, 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1067, at 1155 (June 3, 1982).
6. At present, national policy favors a market economy, and hence the basic ideology of the
FTC's function is not questioned in this article.
7. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-57 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
8. 2 A. LINK, WILSON: THE NEW FREEDOM 434-35 (1956).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
10. Wilson later said: "At first I was inclined to think that various ... practices had become
obviously unfair and detrimental and that it would be best to define them as such in the Clayton
law. As I talked with businessmen and students of legislation, however, I came to agree with them
that these unfair practices would be [best] reached through the Trade Commission law [i.e., the
strong commission bill]." A. W. Shaw, Memorandum of an Interview with rilson (January 4,
1915) (Wilson Papers, Library of Congress), quoted in 2 A. LINK, supra note 8, at 438.
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the very concept of the FTC that it continue to define and seek to remedy
unfair practices.
' The failure of the FTC to learn how to perform this function is a problem
that has plagued the agency since it began operation in 1916. It has relied
heavily upon individual formal adjudications in the apparent hope that respondent businesses would present evidence relating to the market maintenance implications of the FTC's individual decisions. Formal adjudication,
however, was and is not a sound procedure for making generalized decisions. 1 Both the agency and private parties fail to focus on the broad application of individual decisions. The agency seeks to resolve the individual
controversy at hand, and the respondents focus on their personal plight; only
incidental emphasis is placed on the market implications of the FTC action.
Early in the agency's history it became apparent to those involved in
agency policymaking that generalized decisions should be implemented
through procedures that provide general guidance to business. Over the years
the FTC evolved numerous processes for investigating the general facts and
underlying policy questions behind regulatory decisions. While each of these
processes was found wanting, each had advantages. Nevertheless, the FTC
has failed to learn from and to improve on its various experiments; it tends to
abandon one generation of regulatory devices for those of the next generation. 12 Perhaps the solution to the dissatisfaction with the FTC's activities lies
in the use of its past experiences to deal more effectively with regulatory
problems. The agency should learn from its previous experiments to develop
tools that will permit the FTC to perform effectively its market maintenance
functions.
I.

THE FTC EXPERIENCE WITH VARIOUS RULEMAKING DEVICES

The broad policymaking pronouncements of the FTC fit generally under
the administrative law concept of "rulemaking." Administrative law theory
distinguishes between rules that have the force of law, "legislative rules," and
rules with no binding impact, "interpretative rules" and "general statements of
policy.' 3 For most of its rulemaking history, the FTC has relied on interpre11. See I K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.06 (1st ed. 1958).
12. See R. HARVEY, A MANUAL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION LAWS (1916).
13. The distinction between legislative and interpretative rules is one of the most well-established and fundamental in administrative law. Legislative rules are those made pursuant to a
delegation of authority to make rules. In contrast, the authority to make interpretative rules emanates from no other authority than the necessary and proper authority inherent in the creation of
an agency. Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1153 n.24 (D.C. Cir.
1977). Because legislative rules are made pursuant to delegated authority and are, therefore, made
under legislative mandate, they have the force of legislation. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 295-96 (1979); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977). This process means that
a court cannot substitute its own judgment for legislative rules. Indeed, judicial review of legislative rules is usually limited to arbitrariness, capriciousness, and abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys. Co., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416 (1971). Because of their binding effect, legislative rules must be made through public participation. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). Interpretative
rules are merely vehicles for announcing an agency's view on a particular area of law or policy;
they have no force other than the force of judgment expressed in them, and a court is free to
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tative rules. In 1962 the FTC attempted to exercise its legislative rulemaking
authority through its "trade regulation rules."' 14 Later, in National Petroleum

Refiners Association v. FTC'5 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the agency's authority to make legislative rules through the informal pro-

cedures of section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).'

6

After the

holding in NationalPetroleum R§fners, business interests intensified lobbying
efforts to impose the strictures of formal rulemaking on the FTC. The result-

ing Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act (FTCIA), 17 however, affirmed the legislative rulemaking authority of the
FTC. FTCIA required that in making rules the FTC institute only a few trial-

like procedures, thus establishing aclassic "hybrid" rulemaking process.' 8
The FTC's shift in the late 1960s to legislative rulemaking in lieu of polisubstitute its judgment. Koch, Public Proceduresforthe Promulgationof InterpretativeRules and
GeneralStatements of Policy, 64 GEO. L.J. 1047 (1976). Futhermore, interpretative rules need not
be made through public procedures, although some courts have imposed notice and comment
procedures on proposed interpretative rules having substantial impact. See, e.g., Pickus v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d
478,482 (2d Cir. 1972); Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969).
Pending legislation may amend the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to require public procedures for certain interpretative rules. See infra note 62. The "substantial impact" test does not
define interpretative rules, and hence affects only their procedure and not their susceptibility to
judicial review. See K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATivE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 5.03-1, at 150-51
(1976).
14. General FTC procedures for trade regulation rules are set forth at 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.7-1.20
(1982). A trade regulation rule is a legislative rule promulgated by the FTC under the authority of
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. Pub. L. No. 93637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980))
(FTCIA). The FTCIA gives the FTC the authority to prescribe "rules which define with specificity
acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15
U.S.C. § 57a(a)(l)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). See infra notes 49-54, 60-62 and accompanying text.
15. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
16. Section 553 of the APA provides that legislative rules should be made after notice, opportunity for at least written comment, and statement of reasons for the rules. The District of Columbia Circuit assumed that § 553 would apply if it found that the FTC had legislative rulemaking
authority. The APA requires formal or trial-type rulemaking only in situations in which the statute requires a rule "to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(c) (1976).
17. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980)).
18. The concept of "hybrid" rulemaking grows out of a series of decisions holding that the
notice and comment procedures of § 553 of the APA represent a minimum and additional procedures may be required in the interest of complete fact gathering and fairness. The germ of the
concept can be found in Judge Leventhal's opinion in American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d
624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). The first case actually imposing hybrid rulemaking was Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and the concept reached
full bloom in International Harvestor Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Empirical study of these decisions found that hybrid rulemaking did not improve the rulemaking process.
Williams, "HybridRulemaking" Under the Administrative ProcedureAct: A Legal and Empirical
Anaolsis, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401 (1975). See also Leventhal, Improving the Administrative Process-Timefor a NewAPA?, 32 AD. L. REv. 287, 292-93 (1980). The Supreme Court in Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978),
ended judicial imposition of hybrid rulemaking. Relying a good deal on the practical arguments
against judicial imposition of hybrid rules put forth by Judge J. Skelly Wright in an earlier panel
discussion at the National Conference on Federal Regulation, The Courts and the Rulemaking
Process: The Limits of JudicialReview, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 375 (1974), and a literal reading of
the APA, Justice Rehnquist found that § 553 procedures constituted not a minimum but rather the
full extent of the procedures Congress intended to provide. 435 U.S. at 545-49.

NORTH CAROLINA LW REVIEW[

[Vol. 61

cymaking through adjudication and interpretative rulemaking was a significant event in the agency's law enforcement history. For the first time, the FTC
employed a potent enforcement device that could place the members of an
entire industry in jeopardy for committing a practice the FTC considered unfair or deceptive, in less time and with fewer resources than required for individual adjudications. 1 9 The efficacy of this device, however, created problems.
From their inception, the FTC's legislative rulemaking activities have been
soundly criticized, especially by business interests. Unfortunately, the current
response of the FTC to these criticisms is virtually to eliminate its rulemaking
activities.
Commentators have demonstrated that rulemaking is not only an effective regulatory mechanism, but when used in the proper circumstances, an
equitable one. 20 If rulemaking is an effective regulatory device, it is unfortunate that the FTC is considering abandoning rulemaking efforts that serve to
enhance the FTC's market maintenance performance. The FTC should continue to exercise its rulemaking power; breakdowns in the current regulatory
structure should not be used as a justification for removing its rulemaking
authority. Rather than eliminating rulemaking from its regulatory scheme,
the FTC must examine the reasons for widespread dissatisfaction with the
present rulemaking system and strive to improve its rulemaking techniques.
4. Rulemaking Through GeneralPublic Participation
The FTC has used two techniques for promulgating rules through public
participation-industry guides and trade regulation rules. As the name suggests, the guides provide guidance for subject industries by indicating those
practices the FTC considers unfair or deceptive. 2 ' Trade regulation rules are
rules generally applicable to a segment of the industry; the rules are promulgated through the FTC's legislative rulemaking authority and have the force
and effect of law. These two techniques sometimes coexist in the agency's
repertoire of regulatory powers. While the FTC has favored one or the other
at different times, the agency has never effectively combined these procedures
19. See Elman, The Needfor Certainty and Predictabilityin the Applicatlion of the Merger
Law, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 613, 618-24 (1965).
20. See. e.g., STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., IST
SEss., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, VOL. IV, Delayinthe RegulatoryProcess 36-37 (Comm.
Print 1977); Pedersen, FormalandInformalRulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 39 (1975) ("The shift to
rulemaking has been urged and supported both by commentators and to a surprising extent by the
courts."); Shapiro, The Choice ofRulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of-dministratdve
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
21. Organization, Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (1982). The rule states:
§ 1.5 Purpose [of Industry Guides]
Industry guides are administrative interpretations of laws administered by the Com-

mission for the guidance of the public in conducting its affairs in conformity with legal
requirements. They provide the basis for voluntary and simultaneous abandonment of
unlawful practices by members of industry. Failure to comply with the guides may result in corrective action by the Commission under applicable statutory provisions.
Guides may relate to a practice common to many industries or to specific practices of a
particular industry.
Id
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to institute a comprehensive regulatory scheme. The FTC started developing
rules calling for general public participation in 1955 when it instituted its "Industry Guide" procedure. 22 Although this procedure incorporated participation through the basic notice and comment procedure, it was for the purpose
of making rules having the limited effect of interpretative rules.23 The FTC
continued its development of public participation rulemaking in 1962 with the
creation of trade regulation rules. 24 Originally, these rules also used basic notice and comment procedures, but several legislative enactments added ele25
ments of trial and other procedural restraints to this basic procedure.
Experience with both guides and trade regulation rules is instructive in probing the strengths and the weaknesses of FTC rulemaking efforts.
Industry guides were the first FTC rules made through general public
participation. The FTC did not intend guides to have the binding effect of
law.26 Rather, industry guides are intended to guide "the public in conducting
its affairs in conformity with legal requirements. They provide the basis for
voluntary and simultaneous abandonment of unlawful practices by members
of an industry." 27 The FTC may promulgate industry guides when guidance
regarding the legal requirements applicable to a particular practice or set of
practices is in the public interest and would bring about more widespread and
equitable observance of the laws under the jurisdiction of the FTC.28 The
FTC seeks to eliminate widespread trade abuses through the use of guides; the
guides, however, are not intended to prohibit every deceptive practice within a
particular industry or group of industries. Rather, guides are intended to deal
29
with serious and prevalent intra and interindustry abuses.
Industry guides can be divided into two categories: those that apply to a
practice within a particular industry and those that apply to a practice or to
22. Note, Voluntary Complane" An Adjunct to the Mandatory Process, 38 IND. L. 377, 394
(1963).

23. Section 553 requires only an opportunity for written comment; the FTC consistently provided this opportunity in its guide proceedings. Id at 395. Indeed, it regularly provided for oral

presentation in the heyday of its use of guides.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 49-54.
25. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374
(1980); Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975); MagnusonMoss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183
(1975).
26. See Organization, Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 1.6 (1982). The rule
states:
§ 1.6 How [Industry Guides are] promulgated.
Industry guides are promulgated by the Commission on its own initiative or pursuant to petition filed with the Secretary or upon informal application therefor, by any
interested person or group, when it appears to the Commission that guidance as to the
legal requirements applicable to particular practices would be beneficial in the public
interest and would serve to bring about more widespread and equitable observance of
laws administered by the Commission. In connection with the promulgation of industry
guides, the Commission at any time may conduct such investigations, make such studies
and hold such conferences or hearings as it may deem appropriate. ...
Id (footnote omitted).
27. Id. § 1.5.
28. Id.
29. Note, supra note 22, at 396-97.
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practices that are common to several industries. 30 Representative of the first
category are the Guides for the Nursery Industry promulgated by the Commission in 1969.31 The Nursery Guides are specific and detailed, covering
diverse topics related to the special characteristics of the industry, such as deception, misrepresentation, trade practices, and standards. 32 A representative
example of the second category, the interindustry guides, is the guide against
bait advertising.3 3 This is a broadly written guide that seeks to prohibit the
once widely employed practice known as "bait and switch" advertising. 34 The
guides describe generally the improper "bait and switch" technique and spec35
ify certain practices that constitute prohibited conduct under the guides.
The guides procedure is set in motion by independent action of the FTC
or by the complaint of any interested person.3 6 The FTC staff drafts the
guides that are promulgated by the Commission. 37 The FTC, through its staff
members who prepare the guides, may in its discretion "conduct such investigations, make such studies, and hold such conferences as it may deem appropriate." 38 The FTC staff, however, is not required to use any of these tools in
guide preparation.
In the early 1960s the FTC began a continuing conference procedure
under the industry guides program designed to educate businessmen and the
general public about the agency's industry guides program.3 9 By educating
those affected by the guides, the FTC seeks to foster cooperation and thus
enforcement and compliance. 40 Moreover, on request by a businessman af30.

See generally 16 C.F.R. § 1.6 (1982).
31. Guides for the Nursery Industry, 16 C.F.R. §§ 18.0-.8 (1982).
32. For example, the guides prohibited deception through use of product names, Id § 18.2;

deception through substitution of nursery products, id § 18.3; and deception through size and
grade designation, id § 18.4. The guides also developed standards applicable to plants grown in a
wild state. Id § 18.6. Other examples of industry specific guides include guides for the tire labelig and advertising industry, Id §§ 228.0-.19; the metallic watch band industry, id §§ 19.0-.4; the
hosiery industry, id §§ 22.0-.6; and the household furniture industry, id §§ 250.0-.15.
33. Id §§ 238.0-.4. Other examples of interindustry guides include guides against deceptive
pricing, id. §§ 233.1-.5; guides against deceptive advertising of guarantees, id §§ 239.0-.7; and
guides against deceptive debt collection practices, id §§ 237.0-.6.
34. Bait advertising has been described as:
an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product or service that the advertiser in truth does
not intend or want to sell. The essence of such a scheme is to switch the customer from
the advertised product to a product that the advertiser actually wants to sell, usually at a
higher price or on a basis more advantageous to the advertiser.
E. KINTNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTIcEs 176 (2d ed. 1978).
35. 16 C.F.R. §§ 238.0-.4 (1982). Prohibited "bait and switch" practices include a merchant's
refusal to take orders for the "bait" merchandise for delivery within a reasonable time, Id
§ 238.3(d); disparagement of the "bait" product or its accoutrements, id § 238.3(b); and refusal to
show the "bait" product upon request, id. § 238.3(9).

36. Id § 1.6.
37. Id
38. Id See also Comment, Trade Rules and Trade Conferences: The FTC and Business At.
tack Deceptive Practice, Unfair Competition, and Antitrust Violations, 62 YALE L. 912, 921-24

(1953).
39. See Note, supra note 22, at 397.
40. The primary compliance tool in connection with the guides program has been education. This is premised upon the belief that businessmen will regulate their conduct when
informed of what the law demands. Mandatory enforcement measures are utilized only

1983]

FTC R ULEMAKING

fected by the guides, FTC attorneys will provide informal advice to help an
affected businessman determine whether certain specific practices comply with
the applicable guides. In an effort to promote further compliance with the
guides, the4 1FTC regularly distributes copies of the guides to affected
individuals.

The guides procedure has certain advantages over other industry-wide
regulation techniques employed by the FTC. The guides technique is the most
flexible of the agency's regulatory tools. Since industry cooperation is unnecessary for the promulgation of industry guides, they may serve to regulate a
recalcitrant industry group unwilling to engage in self-regulation. 42 Furthermore, because the Rules of Practice 43 require that the FTC employ only summary procedure, guides may be promulgated more quickly than legislative
rules.44
The industry guides program should be used by the FTC to set informal
standards for industry guidance. Although such rules lack the full force and
effect of law, the guides constitute a statement by the Commission of its opinion of the law. Industry guides can provide the FTC with a powerful tool to
foster industry compliance with agency views.
Guides have fallen into disuse partly because of the development of a
more militant consumer protection attitude and a concomitant antibusiness
attitude of the FTC. In the Seventies the FTC saw itself as an adversary fighting business interests that had a perceived tendency to violate the law. Thus,
the FTC was more interested in imposing its will on recalcitrant commercial
interests than in helping businessmen who might wish to obey the law or to
understand the scope of the law. This approach may be counterproductive.
Because section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) is very broad
and ambiguous, 45 effective law enforcement could result from adding concreteness to the regulatory language. Industry guides could provide the necessary concreteness that would allow businessmen to attempt, voluntarily, to
alter their business conduct.
Nonetheless, there was considerable dissatisfaction with the guide program as previously implemented by the Commission.4 6 One of the major criticisms of the program was that the guides lacked sufficient force to compel the
bad actors in the industry to comply with the standards set forth in the guides.
where voluntary measures have failed or where, for reasons of public policy, voluntary
measures are considered inadequate. The guides in no way amount to a finding by the

Commission and do not necessarily affect any formal or informal matter before it.
Id (footnotes omitted).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 399.
16 C.F.R. §§ 0.1-15.491.
Note, supra note 22, at 399.
I C'S Letter to Senate Subcommittee on Bill to Restrict Agency' Jurisdictionover Profes-

sionals and UnfairActs or Practices,42 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1055, at 568
(Mar. 11, 1982); see Wald, The FTC and Industrywide Law Enforcement, 30 J.B.A.D.C. 343, 349-

50 (1963).
46. See E. Cox, RL FELLMETH & J. ScHuLz, THE CONSUMER AND THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969).
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The impact of guides was further diminished by the necessity of introducing
evidence in any enforcement action to support the conclusions reached in the
guide.47 Those willing to risk noncompliance were least affected by the
guides, hence the program merely disadvantiged the responsible businesses
vis-A-vis their unscrupulous competitors. 4 8 As a consequence, guides failed to
protect consumers from the worst members of an industry- those businesses
whose sharp practices do the most damage to consumer confidence in efficient
market functioning. Thus compelled to find a more potent industry-wide enforcement tool, the FTC established the legislative rulemaking program of
trade regulation rules.
In 1962 the Federal Trade Commission began its initial effort at legislative rulemaking by establishing a Rules Division within the Commission to
promulgate trade regulation rules. 49 The first trade regulation rule was
promulgated in 1964 to regulate cigarette advertising. 0 The statement of basis and purpose of this rulemaking effort indicates that a trade regulation rule
is based on facts common to an entire industry and policy of broad applicability.5 1 For the purposes of fairness and efficiency, the FTC determined it
would make rules to cover an identifiable segment of the economy rather than
52
using piecemeal treatment through individual adjudication.
The effect on the FTC enforcement process of trade regulation rules, as
opposed to guides, is to cut off the rights of those who challenge the conclusions expressed in the rule in a subsequent cease and desist order proceeding.5 3
A person who has had notice and an opportunity to participate in the original
rulemaking proceeding has no subsequent right to challenge the rule; the only
right he retains is the right to allege that changed circumstances or other special circumstances justify exemption from a rule in an individual case. 5 4
From the time of the FTC's first promulgation of trade regulation rules,
the argument has been made that the FTC was not originally delegated legislative rulemaking authority.55 Moreover, those opposed to the trade regula47. E. ROCKEFELLER, DESK BOOK OF FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 80 (2d ed. 1976).
48. SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY OF FEDERAL REGULATION, S.
Doc. No. 72, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1977)("In certain kinds of enforcement agencies, though,

such as the FTC, rulemaking is unlikely to be effective unless followed by case-by-case enforcement.") [hereinafter cited as S. Doc. No. 72].
49. E. KINTNER, supra note 34, at 64.

50. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964) (codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 408.1-.4 (1964)).
51. Id
52. Id at 8366-68. See also Wegman, CigarettesandHealh: A LegalAnalysis, 51 CORNELL
L.Q. 678, 749-51 (1966).
53. 16 C.F.R. § 1.22(c) (1982) provides, "Where a rule is relevant to any issue involved in an
adjudicative proceeding thereafter instituted, the Commission may rely upon the rule to resolve
such issue, provided that the respondent shall have been given a fair hearing on the applicability
of the rule to a particular case."
54. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(g) (1976). See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974) ("[s]ome opportunity must be given for a defendant ... to demonstrate that the special circumstances of his case warrant waiving the rule's
applicability"). See also Clagett, InformalAction-Adjudication-RuleMaking: Some Recent Developments in FederalAdministrativeLaw, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 81-83.
55. See, e.g., Burras & Teter, Antitrust: Rulemaking v.Adjudication in the FTC, 54 GEO. L.J.
1106 (1965); Weston, DeceptiveAdvertising and the FederalTrade Commission: Decline of Caveat
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tion rules argued that if the FTC were bestowed with legislative rulemaking
power, it had to exercise that rulemaking authority by using formal, trial-type

procedures. 5 6 Nonetheless, the controversy did not reach a court in a justiciable form until nearly a decade later, in response to the promulgation of a rule

compelling
retail gasoline dealers to post the octane rating on the gasoline
7
pumpsP
In NationalPetroleum RefnersAssociation v. FTC58 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed the agency's legislative rulemaking au-

thority and its ability to make such rules through the informal notice and comment process set out in section 553 of the APA. The court found that section

6(g) of the FTCA was sufficient delegation of authority to support the implication of legislative rulemaking authority. 59 Congress later enacted the
FTCIA,60 which specifically delegates to the agency the authority to promulgate legislative rules in the field of consumer protection, 6 1 but requires the
Emptor, 24 FED. BJ. 548, 568-73 (1964); Note, The FTC's Claim of Substantive Rule-Making
Power: 4 Study in Opposition, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV.330 (1972-73). These authorities misread
the legislative debate on the original Federal Trade Commission Act. It is true that much of the
debate involves the question whether the FTC would be delegated illegal "legislative" authority.
51 CONG. REc. 14,938 (1914). Although this debate talks of "legislative authority," it involves the
nondelegation doctrine and not rulemaking. The question was whether "unfair methods of competition" is a sufficient standard to avoid the delegation of legislative authority. The sponsors of
the bill pointed to existing definitions of that term to show that it had sufficient meaning to provide an adequate standard for either adjudication or rulemaking. Indeed, the sponsors cited numerous cases upholding the delegation of rulemaking authority to agencies then in existence. Id
at 11,084-86 (remarks of Senator Newland); id at 14,930-33 (remarks of Representative Covington). Even better authority supported FTC rule making powers. See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 5.04 (Supp. 1970); Auerback, The Federal Trade Commission Internal
OrganizationandFrocedure,48 MINN. L. REv. 383, 457-59 (1964); Fuchs, Agency Development of
Polay Through Rule-making, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 781 (1964). See generally Baum, Reorganization,
Delay andthe FederalTrade Commission, 15 AD. L. REv. 92 (1963) (discussion of practical advantages of rulemaking over adjudication).
56. The argument ran that even if the FTC had legislative rulemaking authority, the FTCA
required it to make its decisions only after a hearing. Thus, it was argued, a rule was "required by
statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing" and § 553(c) required
such rules to be made through the formal processes of §§ 556-57 and not the informal procedures
of § 553. The Supreme Court soundly rejected this argument. See Federal Power Comm'n v.
Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
57. Posting of Minimum Octane Numbers of Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, 36 Fed. Reg.
23,871 (1971) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 422.1), revokedby 43 Fed. Reg. 43,022 (1978).
58. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in American Nat'l Standards Inst., Inc. v. FTC, No. 791275 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1982), recently rejected a bid by an industry group to reconsider the decision
in NationalPetroleumRefiners. See 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1051, at 331
(Feb. 11, 1982). The Court held that if Congress disapproved of the Court's interpretation of the
FTC's powers, Congress could alter that power by rescinding the Commission's section 6(g) substantive rulemaking authority. The Court stated, "Congress has not taken the initiative to do so
and it is inappropriate for this [c]ourt to do so." Id
59. 482 F.2d at 681.
60. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
61. The Act prescribes hybrid procedures only for consumer protection rules and not for
antitrust rules. Presumably, antitrust rules may still be promulgated under the authority of§ 6(g),
15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1975), which was upheld in NationalPetroleum Refners, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 951 (1974), through § 553 procedures. See American Nat'l Standards Inst., Inc. v. FTC, No. 79-1275 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1982); see also 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1051, at 331 (Feb. 11, 1982).
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Commission to follow certain procedures
in addition to basic informal
62
rulemaking procedures of the APA.
Under the hybrid procedures of the FTCIA, the FTC begins the rulemak63
ing procedure with publication of the initial notice of proposed rulemaking.
At approximately the same time a presiding officer is designated by the Commission to oversee the rulemaking process. 64 The presiding officer then accepts proposals from interested persons regarding issues upon which crossexamination may be appropriate. 65 At this time the FTC also accepts written
submissions of data, views, and arguments about the proposed rule from persons interested in the proceeding. 66 The next step in the rulemaking process is
publication of the final notice of proposed rulemaking.
After publication of the final notice of proposed rulemaking, the presiding officer accepts applications from interested parties requesting a right of
cross-examination during the forthcoming oral hearing stage of the proceeding. 67 The presiding officer may grant or deny the request. He may also designate one party to cross-examine on behalf of many parties if, in his view,
62. Legislation was proposed in this Congress that would add a general requirement of procedures in addition to those currently required by the APA. See S. REP. No. 284, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 94 (1981); S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1981).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(Supp. IV 1980) states:
(b) Procedures applicable
(1) When prescribing a rule under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, the Commission shall proceed in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code [5 USCS
§ 553] (without regard to any reference in such section to sections 556 and 557 of such
title [5 USCS §§ 556 and 557]), and shall also (A) publish a notice of proposed rulemaking stating with particularity the text of the rule, including any alternatives, which the
Commission proposes to promulgate, and the reason for the proposed rule; (B) allow
interested persons to submit written data, views, and arguments, and make all such submissions publicly available; (C) provide an opportunity for an informal hearing in accordance with subsection (c); and (D) promulgate, if appropriate, final rule based on the
matter in the rulemaking record (as defined in subsection (e)(1)(B) of this section), together with a statement of basis and purpose.
(2)(A) Prior to the publication of any notice of proposed rulemaking pursuant to
paragraph (1)(A), the Commission shall publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register. Such advance notice shall(i) contain a brief description of the area of inquiry under consideration, the oblectives which the Commission seeks to achieve, and possible regulatory alternatives
under consideration by the Commission; and
(ii) invite the response of interested parties with respect to such proposed rulemaking, including any suggestions or alternative methods for achieving such objectives.
(B) The Commission shall submit such advance notice of proposed rulemaking to
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and to the
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. The Commission may use such additional mechanisms as the Commission considers useful to obtain
suggestions regarding the content of the area of inquiry before the publication of a general notice of proposed rulemaking under paragraph (1)(A).
(C) The Commission shall, 30 days before the publication of a notice of proposed
rulemaking pursuant to paragraph (1)(A), submit such notice to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and to the Committee on Energy and
Commerce of the House of Representatives.
64. 16 C.F.R. § 1.13(c) (1982).

65. Id § 1.11(a)(4) (1982).
66. Id § 1.11(a)(5).
67. Id § 1.12(d) (1982).
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those parties hold substantially similar views on the rulemaking proceeding. 68
After completion of the oral hearing, the FTC allows interested parties a limited right to make rebuttal submissions. 69

After the oral hearing, the staff makes recommendations to the Commission in a report on the rulemaking record.70 After publication of the staff report, the presiding officer recommends a decision based upon his or her
findings and conclusions, and taking into account the staff report. 7 1 Both of
these reports are made public, and interested parties have a right to submit as
part of the record comments on both the presiding officer's and the FTC stafi's
report. 72 Finally, the entire rulemaking record is submitted to the Commission. The Commission promulgates a final rule, which is published in the Fed73
eral Register. The rule becomes effective on the fourth day after publication.
The FTCIA specifies that a final rule is subject to judicial review within
sixty days upon the request of any interested person.74 The scope of the review of FTCIA rulemaking is more stringent than that normally applied to
section 553 rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. When examining an FTCIA rulemaking proceeding, the court applies a substantial evi75
dence, rather than an arbitrary and capricious, standard of review.
Moreover, FTC rulings that limit the rights of participants to engage in crosswhen such a
examination and rebuttal specifically are made reversible error
76
limitation precludes the disclosure of disputed material facts.

In 1980 Congress modified the trade regulation rulemaking process
through the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
68. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c)(4)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
69. Id § 57a(c)(2)(B).
70. 16 C.F.R. § 1.13(f) (1982).

71. Id § 1.13(g).
72. Id § 1.13(h).
73. Id § 1.14(c).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). This provision raises an interesting question.
If an interested person fails to seek preenforcement review within the requisite time, has he lost
the right to obtain review both prior to enforcement and at the time the rule is applied to him?
See Gage v. AEC, 479 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (failure to join as parties to rulemaking jeopardizes right to seek direct appellate review); North Am. Pharmacal, Inc. v. HEW, 491 F.2d 546, 592
(8th Cir. 1973) (failure to request hearing during time allowed resulted in refusal of review of
order). Seegenerally Stewart, The.Refornmaion of-4mericanAdministrativeLaw, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669, 1752-60 (1975).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). Normally under the APA the arbitrary and
capricious standard applies to rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). The Magnuson-Moss Act
requires substantial evidence review but probably only as to adjudicative, not legislative facts.
CONFERENCE REP. No. 93-1408, Joint Explanatory Statement of the Comm. of Conference, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7755, 7766-67 ("In addition, the
Court would set aside a rule under section 18 if it found that the findings and conclusions of the
Commission with regard to disputed issues of material fact on which the rule is based are not
supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record taken as a whole. Of course, this test
would not apply to findings or determinations of legislative fact."). S. 1080, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 5 (1981) adds a new test for rulemaking: "without substantial support in the rulemaking file,
viewed as a whole, for the asserted or necessary factual basis, as distinguished from the policy or
legal basis, of a rule adopted in a proceeding subject to section 553 of this title."
76. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(3)(B)(i)-(ii) (1976).
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1980.7 7

The Act establishes a legislative veto over the FTC's rulemaking activities: Congress has ninety days to review a final trade regulation rule, and
unless both the House and the Senate pass veto resolutions, the rule becomes
submit a revised
effective ninety days after promulgation.78 The FTC may
79
rule to Congress if both Houses disapprove a final rule.
The 1980 Act also requires the FTC to alter some of the procedures previously used in the trade regulation rulemaking proceeding. Section 8 of the
1980 Act requires the Commission, prior to the commencement of a rulemaking proceeding, to publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking.8 0 The
advance notice must describe the proposed rule, the objectives sought to be
achieved through enactment of the rule, and any alternatives to the rule under
consideration by the agency.8 1 Moreover, section 8 requires the Commission
to submit a notice of proposed rulemaking to the Senate and House Com82
merce Committees thirty days prior to publication in the Federal Register.
Section 15 of the 1980 Act requires the FTC to prepare and publish a
preliminary regulatory analysis of the proposed rule setting forth the objectives sought to be achieved from the enactment of the rule. In addition, the
preliminary regulatory analysis must delineate the perceived benefits, detriments, and effects of the proposed rule on both the public and the industry
It must also delineate any reasonable alternaregulated by the proposed 8rule.
3
tives to the proposed rule.
When the Commission promulgates and publishes a final rule, the agency
simultaneously must issue a final regulatory analysis.8 4 That analysis must inlude, in addition to the material required in the preliminary regulatory analy77. Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 57a, 57a-1, 57b-1, 57b-2,
57b-3, 57b-4, 57c (Supp. IV 1980)).
78. Other legislative veto provisions have been found to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) petitonfor cert.fled sub
nom United States Senate v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 51 U.S.L.W. 3099 (U.S. Aug. 17,

1982) (No. 82-177) & United States House of Representatives v. Consumer Energy Council of

Am., 51 U.S.L.W. 3120 (U.S. Aug. 24, 1982) (No. 82-209); Immigration and Naturalization Serv.
v. Chadha, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 87 (1981). In Consumer Energy
Council of Am. v. FERC a unanimous panel of the District of Columbia Circuit Court held that
the one-house veto provision of the Natural Gas Policy Act was unconstitutional. The court
found that "the one-house veto violates Article I, Section 7, both by preventing the President from

exercising his veto and by permitting legislative action by only one house of Congress." 673 F.2d
at 448. In addition, the court held that "the one-house veto contravenes the separation of powers

principle implicit in Articles I, II, and III because it authorizes the legislature to share powers
properly exercised by the other two branches." Id Incorporating its reasoning in Consumer Energy Council,the D.C. Circuit held unconstitutional the two-house veto provision of § 21 (a) of the
1980 Improvement Act, Consumer's Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 51 U.S.L.W. 2262 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
22, 1982) (per curiam). Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha is now before the United
States Supreme Court for decision. Oral arguments were heard in late February 1982. 50

U.S.L.W. 3687 (Mar. 2, 1982).
79. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l(c) (Supp.

IV 1980).
80. Id., § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(1)(A).
81. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(2)(A)(i).
82. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(2)(C).
83. Id., § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 57b-3.
84. Id. The Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified at 5

U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (Supp. IV 1980)), amends the APA to require cost/benefit analysis of the effects
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sis, an explanation of the reasons the FTC chose the particular final
alternative. The final regulatory analysis must also include a summary of the
significant issues raised during the rulemaking proceeding along with the
85
agency's responses thereto.

The 1980 enactment sets limits on the dollar amount of compensation that

86
can be paid to individual outside participants in the rulemaking process.

Section 10 further requires that the FTC set aside twenty-five percent of its

intervenor funds for small business interests that participate in rulemaking
proceedings at the FTC.8 7 The Act also requires the FTC to develop a small
participation by small business interbusiness outreach program to encourage
88
ests in the rulemaking process.
In both the original FTCIA and the 1980 Act, Congress gave interested
parties greater participatory rights than it granted under the Administrative
Procedure Act. Congress sought to restrict broad substantive delegation of
authority to the FTC through the provision of procedural safeguards and limitations.8 9 Despite these increases in participatory rights and judicial and legis-

lative oversight, there presently exists a strong objection to FTC rulemaking
within some governmental circles and the private sector. This criticism relates
to both substantive and procedural aspects of recent FTC activities. Many feel
that the Commission has overstepped its legislatively granted authority and is

engaged in overregulation in areas in which it is without authority to regulate.
Procedural criticisms include the general failure to provide adequate par-

ticipatory opportunities, unmanageable

rulemaking records, staff bias

problems, insufficient issue designation, and the extensive and inflexible na-

ture of FTC compliance procedures. 90

The primary vehicle for enhancing participatory rights is cross-examinaof rulemaking on small businesses. President Reagan in Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127

(1981), required cost/benefit analysis for all "major rules" no matter where their impact is felt.
85. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 57b-3(b)(2)

(Supp. IV 1980).
86. Id, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(3). Section 10 limits the amount that each participant can
receive to $75,000 per rulemaking proceeding and $50,000 per year per person for all rulemaking

activities.
87. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(2).
88. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(5).
89. In the 1980 Act Congress not only provided procedural restraints on FTC rulemaking,
but it also sought to limit the substantive scope ofFTC rulemaking. This Act significantly restricts
the authority of the FTC to regulate in the following areas: voluntary standards-making or certification activities, id., § 7 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B); children's advertising practices, id., § 11 15
U.S.C. § 57a(i); and funeral industry practices, id, § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57a note. This portion of the
statute limits the FTC regulatory power over the funeral industry to (a) mandatory price disclosure, (b) banning deceptive and coercive practices; and (c) prohibiting unlawful practices.
90. E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE

COMMISSION (1969); B. Boyer, M. Bowers, H. Toiv, D. Edeliman, B. Cartwright, C. DeVita & J.
Bennett, Trade Regulation Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission: A Report
to the Administrative Conference of the United States by the Special Project for the Study of
Rulemaking Procedures Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Act
Parts I, III (May 1979) [hereinafter cited as Boyer Report]. This report was prepared for consideration by the Committee on Rulemaking and Public Information of the Administrative Conference
of the United States. It represents only the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the
Conference, the Committee, or the Office of the Chairman.
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tion. The utility of cross-examination in rulemaking has been debated for
many years. 9 1 Much of this debate has centered around the FTC rulemaking
procedures. Proponents contend that cross-examination helps test the accuracy and integrity of information presented; 92 opponents believe cross-examination fails to improve appreciably the information gathering process and
only provides a delaying device for those attempting to avoid law enforcement.93 While the efficacy of cross-examination in administrative proceedings
is questioned by neutral observers, 94 its contribution to delay in administrative
decision making is equally questionable. 95 In short, neither the costs nor the
benefits of cross-examination seem as high as antagonists suggest.
Delay, however, is a significant problem in the promulgation of trade regulation rules. The FTCIA additions to participatory rights seem to be a factor
in that delay.96 The major cause may be no single factor or set of factors but
rather the added spirit of adversarial confrontation inherent in hybrid
rulemaking. Many members of the FTC rulemaking staff and private participants have proved overcommitted to their particular interests rather than committed to working together towards a mutually satisfactory result. Also
important, however, is that after NationalPetroleum Refners the FTC began
considering rulemaking in more important areas of the economy than in those
to which it had previously directed its efforts. Persons affected by these rules
had both the inclination and resources to fight the FTC. They could, in fact,
carry this fight to the Congress. 97 Consequently, the new procedural opportunities and contentious postures of the participants created a significant impediment to FTC legislative rulemaking. A more cooperative procedure could
lead to more efficient rulemaking efforts at the Commission and hence greater
91. See, eg., Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability, I C.F.R.
§ 305.72-5 (1982). 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 380-81 (1958); Hamilton, Proce-

duresfor the Adoption of Rules of GeneralApplicability: The Needfor ProceduralInnovation in
Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1276 (1972). See also 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 475 (2d ed. 1978) ("The fundamental movement away from rulemaking on the
record [trial-type rulemaking] has been strong and persuasive.").
92. See, eg., Austern, Food Standards: The Balance Between Certainty and Innovation, 24
FoOD DRUG CosM. L.. 440 (1969); Ross, The Big Administrative Proceeding: A Response to Mr.
Westwood, 51 A.B.A. J. 239 (1965); Zwerdling, A Pleafor Clemencyfor Cross Examination, 57
A.B.A. J. 45 (1971). Cf. Clagget, InformalAction-Adjudication-Rulemaking Some Recent Developments in FederalAdministrativeLaw, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51; Robinson, The Making ofAdmnis.
trative Policy,Another Look at Rulemaking and Administrative ProcedureReform, 118 U. PA. L.
REv. 485 (1970).

93. See, e.g., Westwood, Administrative Proceedings:Techniques ofPresiding,50 A.B.A. J. 659
(1964).
94. See, eg., Friendly, Some KindofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1306 n.199 (1975). E.
PRETrYMAN, TRIAL By AGENCY 30-35 (1959) questions the value of cross-examination even in
formal agency adjudications.
95. S. Doc. No. 72, supra note 48, at 32-33. See Dixon, Rulemaking andthe Myth of Cross
Examination, 34 AD. LAW REV. 389, 422-23 (1982).
96. Trade Regulation Rulemaking Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-1 (1982).
97. This fact is evidenced by the restraints in substantive authority included in the Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980) (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 57a, 57a-1, 57b-1, 57b-2, 57b-3, 57b-4, 57c (Supp. IV 1980)).

1983]

FTC R ULEMAKING

use of rulemaking through negotiation rather than through the use of adversarial techniques.
These added procedural safeguards also affect the compilation of a
rulemaking record.98 The rulemaking record was intended to demonstrate the
Commission's reasoning process in a particular rulemaking proceeding and to
provide a basis for meaningful judicial review. A process for developing a
complete record would improve the final agency decision and provide a mechanism for court supervision of the FTC rulemaking process. Thus, the institution of a hybrid procedure was designed to heighten the process of reasoned
decisionmaking; the rulemaking record was envisioned as the cornerstone of a
system designed to ensure a reasoned resolution of material factual issues. 99
In reality, however, the rulemaking record is widely acknowledged to be
unmanageably massive and convoluted. 1°0 As a result, the informal hearings
stage of the proceedings becomes a motions practice. Moreover, the sheer
bulk and unmanageability of the record makes the task of mastering the record expensive and difficult. For participants who are unable to overcome the
time and cost constraints imposed by the record, the record may reduce the
efficacy of their participation. As a practical matter, the prehearing record is
ignored by participants in the rulemaking process. 10 1
Difficulties in using the record contribute to a tendency of the FTC staff
and the participants to treat the successive stages of the rulemaking process as
independent episodes. Consequently, participants submit data and argument
with little reference to the record in earlier phases of the proceeding. This
segmentation creates delay, reduces efficiency, and increases the overall cost of
the agency's rulemaking procedure. 10 2 Moreover, an inaccessible rulemaking
record may jeopardize a rule on judicial review; the record may be so functionally inadequate that it justifies judicial invalidation of the rule.10 3
The problem of overformalizing rulemaking procedure is aggravated by
the inherent impossibility of settling a rule without going through the entire
rulemaking process. Unlike adjudication, the diversity of potential participants in rulemaking compels the agency to play out the process to its end.
Even if those directly affected by the rule can agree prior to process completion, inchoate interests could later object to any incomplete procedures, thus
jeopardizing the rule. Similarly, even if all the directly interested parties
waived some procedural element, that element could not safely be eliminated
without endangering the rule. More importantly, the agency could not work a
compromise through persuasion or tradeoffs, either on substantive issues or in
the rulemaking procedure, with confidence that the agreement would stand in
the future. In contrast, such conduct is standard practice in adjudication. For
98. Boyer Report, supra note 90, Part I, at 7, Part III.

99. Id. Part I, at 7.
100. Id. Part III.
101. See id.
102. Id.

103. Id.
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this reason the inflexible procedural constraints on rulemaking are potentially
more dangerous and counterproductive than they might be in adjudication. In
adjudication there is a kind of marketplace of procedure in which the parties
can bargain about procedures. Persons involved in rulemaking are locked into
regulation rule
the mandated procedure without hope of escape. The trade
1 4
process of the FTC is a prime example of this problem. 0
Staff bias in favor of a proposed rule adds to the adversarial nature of the
proceeding and arguably also reduces its effectiveness by inhibiting cooperation between the government, consumers, and industry groups. 10 5 Many believe that a staff which investigates a problem, drafts a proposed rule, and has
invested a substantial amount of time and effort in support of a proposed rule
naturally will be hostile to an industry or consumer position that opposes that
rule or supports another rule. One of the problems with FTC rulemaking is
the perception, and in many cases the reality, of staff closedmindedness at the
time other actors in the rulemaking proceeding express their views about a
particular rule and its alternatives.10 6 Again, a process built on cooperation
and negotiated settlement of conflicts would alleviate much of the hostility
caused by this perception.
The FTC is also criticized for its failure to articulate the substantive issues
and the legal theories behind a proposed trade regulation rule.10 7 In most
rulemaking proceedings the initial documents, notices, rule provisions, and
staff reports are vague; they rarely delineate what the FTC is doing and why.
As a result, industry members and consumer groups alike remain in the dark
about what question is in issue and on what theories to proceed during the
rulemaking process. Furthermore, this vagueness makes it difficult for participants to know what kind of evidence to submit in support or opposition of a
proposed trade regulation rule.' 0 8 The free exchange of views through the
process of negotiation would greatly increase the sense that the regulatory
problems were identified and faced by the agency before a final rule was
promulgated.
104. For example, some rulemaking presiding officers have found that the issue designation
approach required by the Act, id Part I, at 8-16, was difficult to implement, so they developed a
practice of permitting the parties to cross-examine on any issues in exchange for their promise not
to exceed certain time limits. This approach has been criticized. I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 6.21 (2d ed. 1978). Davis suggests that the excessive use of cross-examination by
the FTC is wasteful and that Congress intended to limit cross-examination to issues of specific
fact. Davis further suggests that the excessive use of cross-examination under FTCIA may indicate to Congress that its experiment with limited cross-examination has failed. Davis believes that
the end result of this FTC abuse may be a move towards rulemaking procedure that provides no
opportunity for cross-examination. Id. See also Kestenbaum, RulemakingReyondA.PA.: Criteria
for Trial-Type Proceduresand the FTC Improvement Act, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 679 (1976).
105. Critique ofthe Administrative Conference Report on FederalTrade Commission Rulemaking, 48 ANTITRUST LJ. 1753, 1776-78 (i980) (panel discussion) [hereinafter cited as Critique].
106. Id.
107. See Boyer Report, supra note 90, Part 1.
108. See id at 40-44. Boyer concludes that if the Commission remains free to frame broad
and novel theories to support its rules, to decide issues on a best estimate basis from an inconclusive record, and to rely on a wide variety of evidence to support its conclusions, then the procedural safeguards incorporated in the statute seem illusory. Id. at 45.
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The major substantive criticism of the FTC trade regulation rule practice
is its failure to apply rulemaking to the appropriate industries or practices.
For example, the FTC seems to disregard the pervasiveness of an alleged deceptive or unfair business practice. 10 9 The FTC is perceived as taking the
stance that some practices are sufficiently destructive to require preventive regulation regardless of the actual prevalence of the practice within an industry.
Although FTC prohibition of widely used deceptive trade practices through
rulemaking procedures is generally regarded as appropriate, many critics of
the FTC find fault with the agency's imposition of a trade regulation rule
when a practice is only employed by a few members of an industry. Obviously, the less pervasive the practice, the more the FTC imposes unnecessary
regulatory requirements on those innocent members of an industry. 10 Many
argue that rulemaking, especially in the later proceedings, becomes a device
"to restrict the lawful activities of law obeyers so as not to discriminate against
law breakers."nI Congress intended that rulemaking be used to attack pervasive practices within an industry; thus the legitimacy of the agency's rulemaking activity is undercut when rulemaking is used to regulate only a few
members of the industry. Moreover, many of the remedies imposed on industry by the FTC require extensive, detailed changes in the way an industry does
business. Extensive, inflexible compliance specifications are inappropriate
when prescribed on an industry-wide basis, particularly when the practices are
followed by only a few members of the industry. The prescription of extensive
compliance procedures is more realistic and appropriate when imposed in an
individual context. 1 2 This criticism has particular relevance because it is exactly these industries against which negotiated rules will be easiest and most
effectively enforced: The majority of the industry already agrees on what the
standard of conduct should be; they would be likely to help police the rule
after promulgation." 13
B. Rulemaking through Negotiation
Several factors have contributed to the failure of the FTC legislative
rulemaking effort. Many of these factors concern the relationship of the rules
to the affected industries. The rules fail to incorporate adequately business
109. See Kirkpatrick, F.TC. Rulemaking in HistoricalPerspective, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1561,
1563 (1980); Critique, supra note 105; Boyer Report, supra note 90, Part I, at 37-39.
110. Id.
111. Kirkpatrick, supra note 109, at 1563. Miles Kirkpatrick, former Chairman of the FTC,
suggests that the addition of adjudicatory expertise and procedures to FTC rulemaking. would
serve partially to solve the rulemaking procedural problems faced by the FTC. Kirkpatrick states:
The appointment of an ALJ to control the proceedings and to render a report in the
nature of an initial decision would help address the'procedural problems of issue formu-

lation and refinement, organization, and presentation of evidence, management of the
record, and would help to guarantee all participants a complete and neutral weighing of
the evidence.
Id. at 1569.
112. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 109; Critique,supra note 105, at 1788-94.
113. For a practical guide to trade regulation rule procedure, see S. KANwiT, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION §§ 6.02-6.07 (1981).
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reality and thereby force business interests to resist the rulemaking and the
final rules. The FTC procedures, especially as modified, give industry substantial opportunity to challenge the rule but actually diminish the industry's
commitment to the final product. The rulemaking takes longer than necessary
because business interests use every tool available to slow down the process.
This delay in turn accounts for much of the dissatisfaction among consumer
representatives. The absence of business commitment to the final rule also
threatens actual, as opposed to formal, compliance with a rule. More industry
commitment, therefore, may be a necessary corollary to successful FTC
rulemaking. These defects suggest that FTC rulemaking requires a technique
which not only assures adequate incorporation of legitimate business realities
but also involves industry members in a way that will enhance their commitment to the final rules. 114 The FTC at one time had such a rulemaking procedure-rules resulting from trade practice conferences.
The "trade practice submittal," which later became known as the "trade
practice conference,"' 1 5 was the agency's first effort at industry-wide regulation. 1 6 Prior to the implementation of the trade practice conference program,
the FTC brought only individual adjudicatory (cease and desist) proceedings
against those who violated the statutes under its jurisdiction. The weakness of
individual adjudication to bring about policy changes led the FTC to develop
an industry-wide voluntary compliance program designed to attack industrywide problems through the use of the trade practice submittal procedure.'17
The first trade practice submittal took place in 1919. The FTC had received numerous complaints about certain common practices in the gold filled,
gold plated, and gold shell jewelry industry. 118 As a result, the FTC called an
industry-wide conference. Discussion between industry members and the
FTC staff resulted in promulgation of simple rules prohibiting several preva114. Group behavior research sees one of the goals of participation as the fostering of cooperation. See, e.g., R. DUBIN, THE WORLD OF WORK: INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND HUMAN RELATIONS 243-44 (1958).
115. The name of the procedure was changed to trade practice conference in 1926 when the
FTC created a separate trade practice conference division.

116. For example, the first conference to be designated with the title "trade practice submittal"
was the conference of the book and writing-paper industry in 1919. The Commission promulgated four rules: (1) that papers were not to be labelled "handmade" unless actually made by that
process; (2) that papers were not to be labelled with the name of a fabric unless qualifying words
were used to show that the name described the finish only, e.g., "Linen Finish" or "Nainsook
Finish"; (3) that foreign geographical names were not to be used to designate papers of domestic
manufacture without the addition of qualifying phrases such as "Made in U.S.A."; and (4) that
the word "parchment" was not to be used without qualifying words to indicate its true character
such as "vegetable parchment," or "imitation parchment." Icittelle & Mostow, 4 Review of the
Trade PracticeConferences of the FTC, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 427, 429-30 (1940).
117. See G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION; A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW AND PROCEDURE (1924); C. MCFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 1920-1930 (1933); S. WAGNER, THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1971); Comment, supra note 38, at 916-17.

118. The participants in the gold shell conference agreed that no mark or brand designating
gold value or wearing quality should be used, except "[t]he words 'gold shell' preceded by the
designation of the alloy of gold used in shell, which shall be preceded by a fraction designating the
correct proportion of the weight of the shell to the weight of the entire ring; illustrated by 1/10 14K gold shell." Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 429 (quoting FTC Release of Nov. 25, 1918).
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lent deceptive industry practices. 19
In 1926 the FTC created a separate Trade Practice Conference Division
to deal with the increasing requests for trade practice conferences. 120 In the
mid-1930s the National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA) procedures usurped
most of the functions of the Trade Practice Conference Division of the FTC.
When the Supreme Court declared the NIRA unconstitutional, 12 1 the FTC
again began to regulate actively through use of the trade practice conference
device. 122 In 1946 the FTC created a Rules Administration Unit within the
Trade Practice Conference Division. 123 The FTC stopped using the trade
practice conference procedure in the mid-1960s; the procedure was formally
abolished in 1979.124

Although the actual trade practice conference procedure was occasionally
altered by the FTC, the basic procedure can be simply and accurately described. Written application for initiation of a trade practice conference could
be made by industry, consumers, or the Commission. Once received, the written request was studied by attorneys on the staff of the Trade Practice Conferto the Commission whether to
ence Division who were required to recommend
125
grant or deny the conference request.
If the Commission granted the request for the trade practice conference,
the application was referred back to the Trade Practice Conference Division,
which then began preparations for the conference. Attorneys gathered information about the allegedly deceptive or unfair practices, and practices of the
industry in general, from a wide variety of sources within government, industry, and trade associations, and from consumers. After gathering sufficient information, the staff attorneys responsible for conducting the conference
drafted a proposed set of industry rules; their task often was accomplished
with substantial input from an industry-appointed committee. 126 After the
draft rules were completed, all members of the industry and any other interested persons identified by the agency were given notice of the meeting and
were invited to attend.1 27 At this time the FTC made available to the confera statement and explanation of
ence participants the draft rules together 1with
28
the FTC's position on the proposed rule.
At the conference the rules proposed by the FTC were discussed by all
119. Id. at 429-30.
120. 1926 FTC ANN. REP. 47-48.
121. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
122. Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 432-33.
123. 1946 FTC ANN. REP. 2,4.
124. 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 41,003 (1979). "In 1979 the FTC ended the device of the
'trade practice rule'. . . . During the 1970's the Commission abolished the industry committee
rule, then began rescinding trade practice rule [sic] until the few remaining were converted to the

status of 'guides"" Id.
125.

16 C.F.R. § 2.24(b)-(c) (1939). Prior to 1946, as a practical matter, almost all requests for

trade practice conferences came from industry groups.
126. Comment, supra note 38, at 922-23.

127. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.24(e) (1939).
128. Comment, supra note 38, at 924.
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participants. In light of this discussion, the trade practice conference staff prepared another set of rules that were then submitted to the Commissioners for
preliminary approval. 129 If the rules were approved by the Commission, a
public hearing would be held in which the FTC, the industry, and the public
discussed the proposed rules.' 30 If the public hearing revealed no need for
substantial change in the proposed rules, the initial rules became final. The
final rules were published in the Federal Register and mailed to industry
members. 131
Final trade practice conference rules were divided into two categories:
Group I rules and Group II rules. 13 2 Group II rules codified practices that the
industry recommended as demonstrative of ethical business practice; they
were not, however, treated by the FTC as a definitive statement of the law. 133
Group I rules were the crucial rules resulting from trade practice conferences
and represented the opinion of the FTC as to the requirements of the federal
laws that it administered.1 34 Group I rules were further subdivided into two
sub-categories: "boilerplate" provisions and rules of specific application. 135
"Boilerplate" rules were broadly written, standardized statements delineating trade practices that were generally believed to be unfair or deceptive.
Common "boilerplate" provisions include prohibition against commercial
bribery, enticement of the employees of a competitor, obtaining confidential
information of a competitor through deceptive means, and disparagement of a
competitor's products. 136 Boilerplate rules primarily served to codify then existing statutory and decisional law.
129. Id. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.24(e) (1939).
130. 16 C.F.R. § 2.24(0 (1939).
131. Id §2.24(g).
132. Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 428-29; McCarty, Trade Practice Conferences, 2
CoRP. PRAc. REv., June 1930, 19, 22; Comment, supra note 38, at 925. The Director of the Trade
Practice Conference Division described the rules as follows:
Resolutions which are intended to define, denounce and eliminate practices which are in
and of themselves illegal or if affirmatively approved by the Commission, classed by it as
Group I rules; resolutions which are intended to define, denounce and eliminate practices which are not in and of themselves illegal but which nevertheless are re/arded by
the trade as wasteful, harmful or otherwise bad, if accepted by the Commission as expressions of the trade, are classified as Group II rules. Resolutions which if put into

effect would violate the law do not become rules but are rejected by the Commission.

McCarty, supra, at 23.
133. Id.
134. Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 428-29; McCarty, Supra note 132, at 23; Comment,
supra note 38, at 925-26; Note, supra note 22, at 390-91.

135. Modern rules dealing with deceptive practices and unfair competition range from
highly generalized to highly particularized specifications of business behavior. A large
portion of the trade rules now in force consist ofstandard provisions cataloging practices
which have long been held illegal under the statutes enforced by the Commission. These
"boiler plate" provisions, repeated verbatim in code after code, deal largely with such

unfair methods of competition as commercial bribery, disparagement of competitors'

products, circulation of false and misleading price tests and price tags, use of lottery
schemes in retail distribution, and many other common forms of unfair or deceptive

practices. The meat of the rules, however, is continued in "custom-made" provisions
patterned to control local practices in a particular industry.
Comment, supra note 38, at 926-27.

136. Id. at 926-27 & n.103-07.
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Specific application rules, on the other hand, were custom-made to deal
with practices peculiar to a particular industry. They were designed to be
readily applicable to specific business problems of the committee regulated
industry. 137 Specific rules were found to be especially valuable when applied
to an emerging or rapidly expanding industry. They were also valuable in
stemming 38emerging, but not yet entrenched, unfair trade practices within an
1
industry.
After trade practice conference rules were promulgated, participating industry members were furnished with "acceptance cards" on which they were
encouraged to register their assent to an intention to observe the rules established by the FTC.139 The Rules Administration Division of the Trade Practice Conference Division was charged with the responsibilty of monitoring
compliance with enacted trade practice conference rules. t4° The enforcement
procedures employed by the Rules Administration Division were flexible and
informal.14 1 The primary enforcement emphasis was on informal field visits,
correspondence, and office conferences.' 42 One commentator stated:
While firms often maintain stoutly that their challenged conduct is
not illegal, the Unit is usually able to persuade businessmen to modify their practices in a way which is satisfactory to the FTC. Such
changes in behavior can be obtained by presenting far less evidence
and factual data than would be required to justify the issuance of a
cease and desist order or even a formal complaint. Ease of enforcement, however, often depends on the type of rule involved. Businessmen comply more readily with a specific "custom-made" rule
developed especially for the industry than with the generalized "boilerplate" provisions. The latter are open to more disputes over interpretation . ...

143

When informal administrative action failed to secure compliance with a trade
practice conference rule by an industry member, the case was referred by the
Rules Administration Division to the Bureau of Antideceptive Practices for
formal action1 44

137. Id. at 927-28.
138. Note, supra note 22, at 392.
139. Comment, supra note 38, at 931 & n.124.

140. Id. at 932; Note, supra note 22, at 393 & n.92. See also 1947 FTC ANN. REP. 4, 71.
141. Comment, supra note 38, at 933.

142. Id
143. Id. at 933-34.
144. Id. at 933-34 & n.144. Like industry guides, see supra text accompanying notes 26-48,
trade practice rules were not intended to have the force of law, and their conclusion had to be
supported in the record of any enforcement proceeding. See, eg., Northern Feather Works, Inc.
v. FTC, 234 F.2d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 1956), in which the court said:
[Tirade practice rules were not taken as legal commands by the hearing ekaminer, the

Commission or ourselves. But we think that a set of rules worked out in conference
between a government agency and an industry can be taken as a guide if, to those responsible for enforcement, they are reasonable and fair.

Id at 338.
This is the current approach taken by the FTC in enforcement proceedings:
In this an adjudicatory proceeding the Trade Practice Rules and Guides must be given

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

Commentators differ in their opinions of the effectiveness of the trade
practice conference program. To make an objective judgment, many variables
must be examined, including the specific rule involved, the industry involved,
the type of rule involved, FTC enforcement monitoring procedures, consumer
and industry monitoring procedures, and the susceptibility of the particular
violation to discovery. The FTC and some commentators conclude, based
largely on a survey of industry responses to official FTC questionnaires, that
trade practice conference rules had a substantial regulatory effect on industry
behavior. 145 One confidential industry survey indicates, however, that when
government, industry, or consumer pressure to comply with trade practice
conference rules was absent, the trade practice conference rules, especially
those promulgated before 1945, were ineffective.
Some of the early trade practice conference rules and submittals are
viewed as having been particularly ineffective. 14 6 Most of these early rules
consisted primarily of broadly worded Group II rules and "boilerplate"
Group I provisions; they, therefore, had only a minimal educational or regulatory impact on industry behavior. In fact, several of the rules promulgated in
the 1920s were in effect promulgated by industry with only minimal FTC involvement. This unique form of industry self-regulation ended in the early
1930s when the United States Justice Department criticized the FTC for aiding and abetting industry violation of the antitrust laws. 147
Trade practice rules promulgated in later years often were ineffective because they were written vaguely. From 1959 through 1961 the FTC, for example, conducted trade practice conferences and promulgated rules for six
different industries. 148 These rules were in many respects identical: all six sets
of rules were composed largely of standard prohibitions repeated in each rule
and guide. These provisions were vaguely worded, "boilerplate" admonitions
to industry not to engage in "bad" acts. The rules did little, however, to assist
either members of an industry or consumers in discerning or correctly solving
the effect which the Commission prescribes for them, not as "a substitute for evidence,"
but "as administrative interpretations having no force or effect as substantive law."
"They serve to inform the public and the bar of the interpretation which the Commission, unaided by further consumer testimony or other evidence, will place upon advertisements using the words and phrases therein set out."
Surrey Sleep Prods., Inc., 73 FTC 523, 531 (1968) (quoting Gimbel Bros., Inc., 61 FTC 1051, 1073
(1962)). See also Wilmington Chem. Corp., 69 FTC 828, 885 n.31 (1966) ("In Lffetime Cullery [56
FTC 1648, 1649 (1959)], Trade Practice Rules were denied probative weight. Government counsel had sought a finding that respondents' [practice] was deceptive simply on the basis of Trade
Practice Rules. The Commission upheld the hearing examiner in refusing to so rule and remanded the case for further evidence.") As these cases suggest, however, trade practice rules are
not without effect and were used by courts to help define the law. Fashion Originators' Guild of
Am. Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 459 (1941).
145. See STAFF OF SENATE TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMM., 76TH CONG., 3D
SEss., MONOGRAPH No. 34, CONTROL OF UNFAIR COMPETITIVE PRACTICES THROUGH TRADE
PRACTICE CONFERENCE PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1 (Comm. Print

1941); Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 449-50.

146. Nelson, TradePractice Conference Rules andthe Consumer, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 452,
467 (1940); see Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 434-38.
147. Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 436-37; Comment, supra note 38, at 939.
148. Note, supra note 22, at 391.
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industry violations of the statutes under the FTC's jurisdiction. 149
Many commentators, while condemning the "boilerplate" rule provisions,
recognize the value of a rule specifically fashioned to address the problems
and meet the needs of a particular industry. If a trade practice conference rule
offers industry and consumers rational, well-defined standards of what constitutes unacceptable and acceptable conduct with regard to a particular practice
or set of practices, both the industry and consumers benefit. Effective protection is afforded when prohibitions are phrased in terms directly applicable to
the specific practices of the industry in question; specific provisions serve both
to crystallize a standard of industry behavior and to simplify the agency's task
of administering the rule. One of the major criticisms of the trade practice
program was its reliance on voluntary compliance. Indeed, some critics of the
voluntary compliance programs have accused the FTC of tacit collusion with
business interests. 150 On occasion, however, government/industry cooperation and voluntary compliance did work even when the industry was subject to
substantial regulation. The textile rules, which required informational labelling on many different types of textiles, represent an early effort by the FTC to
regulate on an industry-wide basis that had a substantial effect on industry
trade practices.' 51 The textile industries traditionally were reluctant to cooperate with efforts to end deceptive practices within the industry. Industry
members finally were convinced to cooperate with regulatory attempts as a
'result of pressure brought to bear by consumer groups. l5 2
Several controversial sets of trade practice conference rules resulted from
the textile industry conferences. The Rayon Industry Rules, for example, were
vigorously opposed by members of the rayon industry. The FTC rejected a set
of rules submitted by the rayon industry; instead, the FTC substituted its own
set of proconsumer rules. The Rayon Rules, as the Silk Rules promulgated a
153
year later, required detailed affirmative representation about fiber content.
This affirmative disclosure requirement went beyond then existing common
law requirements. 1 54 Evidence indicates that the various textile rules had a
149. Id. at 391-92.
150. See, eg., E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. ScHuLz, supra note 90, at 60-64.
151. Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 439-44; see generally Kittelle & Campbell, Powerof
the Federal Trade Commission to Require Informative Labeling of Textiles, 20 B.U.L. REv. 23

(1940).
152. Comment, supra note 38, at 940-41 & n.187.
153. The requirement of informative labelling is best illustrated by Rule 1 of the Rayon
Rules which states that it is an unfair trade practice not only to label rayon as not being
rayon, or as being something other than rayon, but also to offer it for sale "without
disclosure of the fact that such material or product is rayon."
Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 439. This provision was also incorporated by reference in
the following trade practice conference rules: Popular Price Dress Manufacturing Industry; House
Dress and Wash Frock Manufacturing Industry, Infants and Children's Knitted Outwear Industry, and Ribbon Industry. Id at 439 n.67. The labelling requirements of the textile rules were
quite detailed. Rule 6 of the Rayon Rules specifies that fabric fiber content shall be listed in order
of predominance by weight. Rule 6 further requires revelation of the actual pertcentage of the
fiber used in the fabric where any listed fiber represents less than 5% of the fabric by weight. Id at
439.
154. See id at 44749.
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substantial5 impact on the manner in which the textile industry conducted
15
business.
The textile rules represent an early instance in which consumer groups
had a marked influence on the promulgation of industry rules.' 5 6 Moreover,
the rules were finally adopted over industry objection. Nevertheless, evidence
indicates that the textile industries complied with the rules once promulgated,
despite their initial opposition. It appears clear, then, that not all voluntary
compliance procedures serve industry interests at the expense of public interest. In this instance, as well as many others, the FTC, the industry, and consumers came together, albeit reluctantly, to make rules with which industry
57
complied.1
The other major criticism of the trade practice conference rule procedure
focuses on the enforcement attention given to the rules after promulgation. A
successful regulation program based on voluntary compliance must be sup58
ported by the forthright and persistent application of enforcement tools.'
Unless enforcement action is applied consistently, trade practice rules can
have only a limited effect on business behavior.' 59
Until 1946 the FTC did not have a division formally charged with monitoring and administering the trade practice conference rules. With the addition of the Rules Administration Division in 1946, the FTC established a
formal mechanism with staff assigned specifically to administer rules. Commentators generally agree that the addition of the Rules Administration Divi155. Comment, supra note 38, at 940-41 & n.187.
156. Although the New York Board of Trade attempted to institute voluntary reform procedures, such efforts were unsuccessful. The textile rules conferences were called primarily because
of the pressure brought to bear on the Commission by consumer groups led by the New York City
Federation of Women's Clubs. Textile industry groups were pressured into participating in the
trade practice conference proceedings by retailers who in turn were pressured into participating in
the proceedings by consumers. Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 441.
157. Id. at 441-43. Occasionally industry groups and representatives advocated industry selfregulation as an alternative to government regulation. See, e.g., Filene, Voluntary Controlof Unfair Business Practices, 17 HARV. Bus. REv. 434 (1939); see generally Heermance, Sef-Regulaton
andtheLaw, 10 HARV. Bus. REV. 420 (1932). Filene suggested that industry self-regulation could
be achieved by industries acting in cooperation with the FTC; the FTC was to serve as the "final
federal enforcing agency." Filene, supra, at 440. This self-regulation was to be accomplished in a
several step process. First, each facet of the industry, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers,
would meet separately to prepare a detailed list of prevalent unfair business practices in need of
control or elimination. Second, all facets would meet together to agree on a master list of undesirable practices; all participants would then assent to abstain from the listed practices. Third, a
clearing house would be set up to monitor compliance and take appropriate action against violators, backed by the cooperation between the clearing house and the FTC. Filene, supra, at 440.
The author states:
It has often been said that there can be no enforcement of a law or of an agreement
unless there is some ultimate penalty in the background. But the constant reporting of
code violations to the clearing house; the constant pressure from the clearing house on
violations; and the fact that persistent violations are recorded by the clearing house and
may be reported to the Federal Trade Commission-these factors should result in a
moral pressure on the "chiseling minority" to mend its ways and conform to the agreedon code of ethics of the industry.
Id. at 441.
158. S. Doc. No. 72, supra note 48, at 36.
159. Id at 41-43.
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sion had some effect on industry compliance. 160 The Division, however has
been criticized for not being equal to the task. Severe manpower and funding
16 1
limitations prevented the unit from being more than marginally effective.
Although failure to enforce the trade practice rules was a major defect in
the system, there is no evidence that the Commission is currently enforcing
trade regulation rules any more rigorously. There have been few complaints
raising violations of trade regulation rules and no hearings. Though the
FTCIA permits the FTC to go directly to court to obtain an injunction against
violations of its rules, the FTC rarely has done so, and it is doubtful that the
next few years will find it exercising this authority. 162 Thus, while improved
enforcement would make rulemaking a more potent law enforcement tool, improved enforcement is dependent on the type of rule employed by the FTC.
On the other hand, the adversarial nature of the trade regulation rules process
creates a lesser likelihood of voluntary compliance; therefore, negotiated rules
seem preferable if limited enforcement is likely.
II.

IMPLEMENTING A SYSTEM INCORPORATING RULEMAKING
THROUGH NEGOTIATION

The challenge of FTC regulation is finding procedures that are acceptable
to the factions affected by the agency's regulatory decisions. At the same time,
any widely used procedure must provide a balanced regulatory structure
through which the FTC can effectively fulfill its legislatively assigned task of
regulating the practices of American business.
Each procedure previously discussed-trade practice conference rules, industry guides, and trade regulation rules-possesses advantages and disadvantages. The chief criticisms raised regarding the voluntary compliance
procedures are their lack of actual regulatory effect, whether as a result of tacit
collusion between industry and government, lack of enforcement, or ineffectual regulatory standards. The primary criticisms of the current trade regulation rulemaking procedure revolve around what is often described as
overregulation or insensitive regulation imposed upon industry. The task is to
devise a scheme that avoids overregulation but that at the same time effectively accomplishes the agency's regulatory goal.
To accomplish these divergent objectives, the FTC should institute a procedure consciously employing each rulemaking process when it can be used
most efficiently. The first, and usual, method of regulation would be accomplished through negotiated rulemaking using a modified trade practice conference rulemaking procedure. 163 Yet the agency's other two rulemaking
160. Comment, supra note 38, at 941-43; Note, supra note 22, at 393.
161. Comment, supra note 38, at 942-43.
162. S. Doc. No. 72, supra note 48, at 41-43.
163. The Administrative Conference of the United States is considering a proposal that recommends creation of a supplemental negotiation rulemaking procedure designed to avoid some of
the pitfalls associated with traditional rulemaking. This recommendation proposes that the Fed-

eral Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-14 (1976 & Supp. IV 1976) [hereinafter cited as
FACA] and the APA be amended to facilitate the use of negotiation rulemaking procedures. Rec-
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procedures should not be ignored. When broader participation seems necessary but industry cooperation seems likely, the Commission may choose to
ommendation 82-4: Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (June 18, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Recommendation], based on P. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise?
(Jan. 1982) (Report prepared for consideration of The Committee on Interagency Coordination of
the Administrative Conference of the United States). The Recommendation states that "[tihe purpose of this recommendation is to establish a supplemental rulemaking procedure that can be used
in appropriate circumstances to permit the direct participation of affected interests in the development of proposed rules." Recommendation, supra, at 2. It identifies the major failure of current
rulemaking procedures as the adversarial postures it induces in the participants:
[T]he participants, including the agency, tend to develop adversarial relationships with
each other causing them to take extreme positions, to withhold information from one
another, and to attack the legitimacy of opposing positions. Because of the adversarial
relationships, participants often do not focus on creative solutions to problems, ranking
of the issues involved in a rulemaking, or the important details involved in a rule. Extensive factual records are often developed beyond what is necessary. Long periods of
delay result and participation in rulemaking proceedings can become needlessly expensive. Moreover, many participants perceive their roles in the rulemaking proceeding
more as positioning themselves for the subsequent judicial review than as contributing to
a solution on the merits at the administrative level. Finally, many participants remain
dissatisfied with the policy judgments made at the outcome of rulemaking proceedings.
Id. at 1.
Fourteen specific suggestions are made describing the procedure that should be instituted to
establish a negotiation rulemaking procedure:
1. Agencies should establish a regulatory negotiation group to draft a proposed rule.
2. Congress should enact legislation to facilitate negotiated rulemaking.
3. Congress should authorize agencies to designate a convenor to organize negotiations.
The convenor should be a neutral organization, individual or agency appointed by the implementing agency.
4. The convenor should conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether a negotiating
group should be empanelled. The convenor should look to the following considerations to determine the usefulness of supplemental rulemaking to solve a given problem.
a. Issues should be mature and ripe for decision.
b. Resolution of issues involved in rulemaking should not be such as to require the
negotiation participants to compromise fundamental tenets.
c. Only a limited number of interests should be affected by the negotiation, the affected
interests should be identified and then representatives should be selected to participate in the
rulemaking conference.
d. There should be several diverse issues involved in the proceeding so as to allow participants to rank their priorities.
e. No single issue should dominate the negotiation.
f. Participants should make a good faith commitment to negotiate and draft a rule.
g. The agency should be willing and designate an appropriate staff member to represent
the agency in the negotiation.
5. If the convenor and the agency determine that negotiation rulemaking is appropriate, the
convenor should determine what interests are affected, negotiation participants, the scope of the
negotiation and the negotiation schedule.
6. If an existing nongovernmental standards-writing organization exists, and enjoys the support of respective interests involved, the existing organization should be designated a regulatory
negotiation group for the purposes of this recommendation.
7. The agency should publish notice of proposed negotiation rulemaking in the FederalRegister.
8. The agency should also designate a senior official to represent the agency in negotiation
and identify the official in the FederalRegister.
9. The agency should provide financial assistance to affected interests who would otherwise
be unlikely or unable to participate in negotiation.
10. A mediator should be appointed if such an appointment would facilitate effective negotiations.
11. The goal of the negotiating group should be to arrive at a consensus rule. If a consensus
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employ interpretative rulemaking-industry guides. In the event that an industry fails to make a good faith effort to cooperate with consumers and the
government, the Commission might need to resort to legislative rulemakingtrade regulation rules--or class adjudications.
The first effort should be negotiated rulemaking. To be effective, the
FTC's procedure for making negotiated rules should be modified in several
ways. 164 First, the FTC should be required to promulgate detailed, custommade industry rules in response to an actively conducted trade practice conference. A resort to boiler plate rules would serve only to denigrate the process in
the eyes of both industry and the consumer.
Any interested person should be allowed to request an agency trade practice conference. The industry, in particular, may be willing to do so only if
few members are participating in unfair practice or if the situation indicates a
strong threat of more forceful regulation, legislation, or individual complaints.
The FTC staff should study the request for a conference and advise the Commission whether to institute a proceeding. The FTC should make available to
all interested persons a record and summary of trade practice conference requests, and any Commission action taken, in order to prevent claims of inappropriate Commission action or inaction. By providing a record of its actions
with regard to conference requests, the Commission would meet any criticisms
that it failed to respond adequately to requests for trade practice conferences.
Of course, the agency's use of trade practice rules should not be totally
reactive. It should include in its studies and investigation of various industries
the potential for industry cooperation in solving identified problems. In addition, it should plan law enforcement strategies that incorporate trade practice
rules among the options available.
Once the Commission determines that institution of a trade practice conference is necessary, it should notify industry members and publish a notice of
the impending proceeding in the FederalRegister. The Commission should
then establish an informal committee to draft a set of proposed rules and to
deliniate the major issues to be dealt with at the trade practice conference.
This committee should be composed of the interested factions in the rulemakrule cannot be arrived at the group should state specifically the problems encountered that prevented establishment of a consensus rule.
12. The negotiating group should be authorized to hold closed meetings if the group feels
that closed meetings would facilitate the rulemaking.
13. The agency should publish the text of the negotiated rule in the FederalRegister, followed by any proposed agency changes with reasons therefor.
14. The negotiating group should be given an opportunity to review any comments received
in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking to determine whether changes in the proposed
rule need to be changed. Final responsibility for issuing the rule, however, should remain with the
agency.
Id. at 2-5. See P. Harter, supra.
This recommendation, although addressing the informal rulemaking process as a whole, has
equal application to FTC rulemaking.
164. A Senate bill introduced in this Congress would establish a structure for rulemaking
through negotiation for all government agencies. See S. 1601, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
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ing process, typically the industry, consumers, and the FTC. 165 By providing
for an appointment of a committee composed of various factions with differing
views, the Commission could successfully avoid the staff bias problem encountered in the present trade regulation rulemaking procedure. In addition, the
committee would serve to deliniate and focus issues prior to the proceeding, so
that all participants would have a better idea of the goals to be accomplished
and the stakes involved in the upcoming conference. As a result, the proposed
rules would likely be more responsive to the needs of all interested parties
early in the process.
The FTC should allow the industry that is the focus of the conference to
appoint members of the committee whenever feasible. Many industries have
trade associations that could serve this function. The Commission must, however, assure that industry representatives represent the views of all facets of the
industry. The FTC should therefore reserve the right to select alternate members of the committee and to reject the preselected industry members if it determines that a faction of the industry would otherwise go unrepresented or be
overrepresented in the preconference discussions.
The FTC might appoint a similar number of consumer representatives to
the preconference committee to assure that all views are aired. The FTC
should have wide discretion to appoint consumer representatives that adequately represent the consumer interest in a particular trade practice conference proceeding. These consumer representatives could be appointed from the
various general and specialized consumer rights organizations and from the
general public.
While consumer representatives may be useful, they should be included
only when they will have something to contribute and should not be considered advocates for a point of view. If the result is unbalanced representation
in favor of the industry, the rule will be open to challenge. On the other hand,
the purpose of the conference is to ensure that the imposition of consumer
interest values does not unduly interfere with the operation of the marketplace; therefore, it is the industry's views and information that are crucial.
Once a committee is aplointed, it should determine and designate the
principal issues to be discussed and resolved at the forthcoming trade practice
conference. The FTC staff will be responsible for the background work necessary to prepare for the trade practice conference. By drawing on outside expertise at this point in the process, the FTC would reap the added advantage
of diversity of viewpoint at the earliest possible phase in the proceeding.
. 165. The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-14
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980) may
apply to such conferences. If so, the FACA would create problems in terms of openness and
notice requirements. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE SUBCOMM. OF ENERGY, NuCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 2D. SEss., FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT, SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS (Comm. Print 1978); Markham, The Federal

Advisory CommitleeAct, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 557, 571 (1974). Because some of these requirements
would interfere with rulemaking through negotiation, Senate Bill 1601, S. 1601, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 8 (1981), would exempt a "regulatory negotiation committee" from the Act.
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Once the committee designates issues, it should discuss and draft an initial set of proposed rules addressing the problems that are to be faced at the
forthcoming conference. The committee need not agree on a set of proposed
rules at this stage. In fact, well-articulated alternatives may serve further to
clarify and emphasize the crucial issues to be decided at the conference. For
example, if three subgroups of the committee each supports a different or partially different set of rules for dealing with the problems to be discussed at the
conference, the three alternatives and supporting rationales should be set out
for discussion by the participants at the trade practice conference. The system
need not be limited because, generally speaking, the more alternatives the
better.
After the proposed rules or alternative set of rules are drafted, the FTC
should set a time, date, and place for the conference, notify the interested parties, and publish the proposed rules in the Federal Register.' 6 6 Even though
the trade conference procedure utilizes selective participation, public notice
should be given. The notice should explain the alternative proposals and why
the proposed rule was adopted. This notice should be sent to all participants
and published.
When the conference convenes, the FTC staff should function as mediator and leader of the conference participants. The FTC attorneys should seek
to explore the various alternative regulations and to encourage open and frank
discussion by all present. The agency should function as a neutral facilitator
to encourage creative exploration of available solutions to a given problem.
The FTC-must designate representatives to participate in the conference.
Although this panel should be larger than the issue-designating committee, it
must remain selective. Selective representation may exclude some who wish a
voice in the process, and the Commission must remember that the goal of this
process is to reap the benefits of small group decisionmaking. A small number
of participants assures that the proceeding will efficiently consolidate representation of the major interests. It will tend to mold opinion and information into
a workable unit and thus assure a compact record. More importantly, the
small group will permit real exchange of understanding, elaboration of special
interests' difficulties, and development of ideas to bring about real problem
solving. Therefore, despite the desire to include all interested participants in
the conference panel, rulemaking panels must be small enough to take full
advantage of the conference approach.
The character of the actual meeting must be that of a committee trying to
solve a common problem. Much of the advantage of the conference approach
will be lost if the exchange deteriorates into a mere struggle to protect individ166. The FACA generally requires that all advisory committee meetings be open to the public.
5 U.S.C. app. § 10 (1976). Moreover, the records, minutes, drafts, agenda, transcript, and all other
documents of each advisory committee must be made available to the public. The FACA requires
that timely notice be given through publication in the Federal Register that an advisory committee

is to be created. Id § 9(a)(2). This notice requirement is designed to assure that the public and
the Congress have an opportunity to challenge establishment of any proposed committee. S. REP.
No. 1098, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972).
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ual interests. The final aim must be group consciousness, and every representative must understand that he or she is there to help fashion a workable,
negotiated regulatory scheme. The process can succeed only if industry, government, and consumers have a realistic view of the relative positions of each
other and thus make a cooperative rulemaking effort. The Commission must
serve not as a cohort of either industry or consumer interests, but rather as a
champion of both. By allowing Commission attorneys to maintain an objective view of a problem and its solution, a more evenly reasoned rule is likely to
result from a regulatory proceeding.
In this regard, the desired openness of the conference becomes a problem.
In negotiation, there is value in private exchange, argument, and compromise.
Rulemaking negotiation also might need the freedom of nonpublic negotiation. On the other hand, industry-wide deals are even less likely to meet with
public trust than other closed door government negotiations. The Federal Advisory Committee Act limits nondisclosure of information discussed in meetings between the government and outside persons. 167 Therefore, the pressure
to open the meetings is strong but should sometimes be resisted.
Ordinarily the conference should be open to observation by the general
public. Experience shows that very few observers from outside the affected
industry will attend. The advantages of selective participation will not be diminished by the open meeting because those advantages stem from creating an
exchange of views among a workably sized group. That this exchange is conducted in public ordinarily will not matter. When, however, the conferees find
the need for closed door meetings, the process might provide for it. The Federal Advisory Committee Act might be avoided by arguing that business negotiation by its nature involves confidential business information. Since the
results of the negotiation will be available for public scrutiny there should be
little danger in the closed door process. As an added precaution, however, the
closed meeting should be taped so that a court may hear the tapes of the entire
negotiation session if asked to review allegations of collusion. In this manner,
the process can take advantage of the recognized advantages of closed door
negotiation without raising the specter of government/industry collusion that
plagued the prior use of trade practice conferences.
Occasionally, more than one conference may be needed to define adequately issues and attempt to resolve differences or reach compromise between
the participants in the conference. The most valuable function of the trade
practice conference procedure is the exchange of information, views, and ideas
by the participants. This exchange may reflect practical problems or disclose a
more complicated situation than was originally surmised. The first conference
may recommend no more than a second conference to consider a more sophis167. FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(d) (1976). Any group that meets in an advisory capacity with
government officials may fall under the FACA. See Center for Auto Safety v. Cox, 580 F.2d 689,
693-94 (D.C. Cir. 1978). But see Nader v. Baroody, 396 F. Supp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1975); Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc. v. HEW, 409 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1976), at'd,551 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The FACA excludes advice and information sought by federal officials "for the purpose of carrying out an operational duty." Markham, supra note 165, at 577.
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ticated proposal, or it may resolve only a few of the issues presented to it and
leave other problems for the future. It may recommend the adoption of an
interim or an experimental set of rules, the results of which will be continually
studied and made the subject of a future conference. The conference may
recommend that the problem be made the subject of public rulemaking
through industry guides or trade regulation rules, or remedied by class
adjudication.
After discussion, the participants should try to formulate a common position on the issues presented. Unanimity, however, is unnecessary. Some consolidation and consensus should be produced, but it is not necessary that the
committee present only one view. The Commission, however, must take ultimate responsibility for the final rule. It must, therefore, adopt a set of rules
that meets the needs and addresses the views of all conference participants.
After the conference, notice of the rule submitted by the conferees to the
FTC for approval should again be published. Any report or memorandum in
support of the proposed rule should be made available to the public. The
notice should describe the method for obtaining such supporting documents.
The nature and force of the rule should be an important part of the decision. The conference should decide how much force it wants to give a negotiated rule. The force might vary from a rule that the Commission hopes will
find industry acceptance to one that the Commission advises will be vigorously
enforced with individual complaints. The concreteness of the regulatory prescription might also vary greatly. The conference may recommend experimentation or it may be content merely to provide answers to a few established
scenarios. Flexibility in the nature of the rule will be an important element in
negotiated rulemaking.
The ABA Antitrust Committee distinction between "definitional" rules
and "preventive" rules is useful in this context. 168 "Definitional" rules merely
define bad practices; the industry is instructed how to behave. "Preventive"
rules establish a compliance apparatus with which to prevent law violation.
The whole industry is required to comply with somewhat burdensome procedures even though only a few members are using illegal practices or would fail
to comply with the agency's wishes once they were articulated clearly. Preventive rules create a significant burden on both the innocent and guilty, and their
overuse has led to much of the criticism of FTC regulation. The trade practice
conference should avoid preventive rules except in the rare case. By its nature,
the conference procedure should result in definitional rules with which the
vast majority of the industry will comply without stringent compliance procedures. When preventive rules are necessary, they generally should be undertaken in trade regulation rule proceedings, because they would be supported
by a record built on public procedure and should be strictly enforceable.
Moreover, legislation covering FTC rulemaking procedure dictates that
168. Report of the Section ofAntitrust Law, American Bar Association Concerningthe Federal
Trade Commission Structures,Powers and Procedures,ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA),
Special Supp. 5-6 (Feb. 14, 1980).
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trade practice conference rules must be interpretative. The trade practice rules
traditionally have been interpretative. 169 In addition, both the FTCIA and the
1980 Improvement Act mandate procedures for legislative rules and thus foreclose rulemaking by negotiation for such rules.' 70 It could be argued that
these procedures can be waived, but because they accrue to the benefit of the
general public it would be difficult to make the waiver valid against all interested persons with a right to participate. Regardless, the classification of trade
practice rules as interpretative or legislative may be immaterial in the FTC's
own enforcement action, for the law is fairly clear that an agency is bound by
its interpretative rules. 17 1 The procedural difference may be that the administrative law judge in a subsequent enforcement hearing will have to go through
the process of taking official notice of a trade practice rule.172 These considerations are not too important because the process anticipates large scale cooperation; enforcement factors would relate only to a small number of recalcitrant
industry members.
The Commission must zealously monitor industry compliance with an enacted trade practice conference rule. Successful use of this procedure requires
that the agency promptly enforce the rules against nonconforming firms. The
Commission must be willing to establish the machinery necessary to maintain
contact with industry in the post-rule period. In addition, the agency must
establish a firm policy of pursuing violators and correcting violations. The
government must be willing to invest sufficient resources and manpower in the
enforcement arm of the trade practice conference process to ensure the forceful presence of Commission regulatory authority. One of the strongest criticisms of the old trade practice conference procedure regarded its
ineffectiveness because of the lack of agency enforcement; this defect must be
avoided if reinstituting the procedure is to be successful.
This is not to say that every violation should be a matter for prosecution.
The FTC should operate on the assumption that a timely warning is more
valuable and less expensive than a tardy prosecution. The FTC should work
actively with industry to ensure compliance. Formal prosecution should be
viewed as a last resort used against recalcitrant industry. The more flexible,
informal means of enforcement should be used to encourage industry compli169. See Northern Feather Works, Inc. v. FTC, 234 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1956); Surrey Sleep

Prods., Inc., 73 FTC 523 (1968).

170. Senate Bill 1080, S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1981), would require procedures for
an interpretative rule that "has general applicability and substantially alters or creates rights or
obligations of persons outside the agency."
171. Failure of an agency to follow its own interpretive rules should beprimafacieevidence of
arbitrary and capricious administrative action. See Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F.
Supp. 1298, 1303 n.23 (D.D.C. 1973), modfed on other grounds, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on S. 1080 §upported a provision including important
interpretative rules under its public procedure by business testimony that "[in practice, this 'gui-

dance' was just as binding as a substantive rule." S. REP. No. 284, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 111 (1981)
(citing RegulatorReform 4c--S. 1080.: Hearingson S. 1080 Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory
Reform ofthe Senate Comm ofthe Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 629 (1981)).
172. See Harry E. Strauss, 63 FTC 1912, 1930 (1963). But see Surrey Sleep Prods., Inc., 73
FTC 523, 531 (1968).
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ance as long as the informal compliance processes do not become specious, as
they have in the past.
If negotiation does not work, the FTC should consider one of the other
two forms of rulemaking. Negotiated rules must be a complement to the two
forms of rulemaking through public participation. The three types of rules
should be viewed as parts in an arsenal of law giving and law enforcement
techniques. In some cases general public participation or open forum will be
the best way to proceed. It may be that some rules should have the force of a
legislative rule. In other industries, problems are serious and concrete enough
to warrant solution through class adjudication.
Industry guide procedures should be used as an adjunct procedure to the
trade practice conference rules. When, for example, a particular practice pervades several industries, it might be impractical and unwieldy to attempt a
trade practice conference. The industry guide procedure could be used to promulgate standards in such a situation; the FTC could still choose to make
intrepretative rules through abbreviated procedure but could additionally encourage public participation in the process.
Generally, the guides present a more feasible, practical approach to interindustry regulatory efforts and enforcement than that available through the
traditional trade practice conference procedure. The trade practice conference
procedure is designed to regulate a single industry. Prior to the institution of
the guides program in 1955, the FTC sought to regulate on an interindustry
basis by including standard boilerplate prohibitions and rules in each set of
trade practice conference rules. Guides proved more effective in accomplishing this function. Frequently a practice is prevalent in several industries; issuance of an industry guide has the practical effect of providing a standard rule
regulating practice that is applicable to the marketplace as a whole.
Furthermore, the Commission is not required to secure industry cooperation when issuing guides. Thus, industry guides can be formulated to regulate
a recalcitrant industry not initially inclined towards cooperation and compliance with FTC regulatory ideas. In other words, the industry guides process
not only gives the regulated industry the opportunity to participate in regulatory efforts, but also gives the FTC an offensive weapon against an industry
that refuses to cooperate.
Although the guide process may be chosen because of the absence of anticipated industry cooperation, it also carries the judgment that a legislative
rule is inappropriate to the situation. This judgment could be based on a finding that interindustry rules could not be sufficiently specific to justify a rule
having the force of law. It could be based on the FTC's need to experiment
with more broadly worded and less forceful rules. The FTC might choose
guides in order to act quickly without the interference of the cumbersome
trade regulation rule procedures.
Industry guide procedures should be viewed as a flexible measure with
which the FTC can fill in the procedural gaps created when the institution of a
trade practice conference or the trade regulation rule procedures would be
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inappropriate or difficult to accomplish. Guides should be promulgated as
they are now: with a minimum of procedural requirement and a maximum of
flexibility. In connection with the promulgation of industry guides, the Commission should use the provisions of section 1.6 of the Rules of Practice, which
allows the Commision staff to take advantage
of compulsory processes in the
173
investigative, nonadjudicative procedures.
As a last resort, when neither a trade practice conference procedure nor
an industry guide procedure is appropriate, the FTC should consider initiation
of a trade regulation rulemaking procedure. While trade regulation might not
be preferred, it should be retained in the agency's arsenal of regulatory weapons. Before the FTC uses the trade regulation rulemaking procedure, however, it should determine that there exists a need for concrete rules having the
force of law. In the event that the agency decides to institute a trade regulation rulemaking proceeding, the industry affected should have a thirty-day
grace period in which to make a good faith effort to argue for the institution of
a trade practice conference in lieu of a trade regulation rule. This procedure
will encourage industry cooperative efforts and place the responsibility for the
successful outcome of the trade practice conference on the industry to be
regulated.
The FTC should identify through procedural rules situations in which it
will make the choice of legislative rulemaking over guides or negotiated rules.
Industries with a large number of bad actors, for example, might require the
added force of legislative rules. Industries in which negotiated rules or guides
have been tried might suggest at least certain instances in which legislative
rules should be useful. Interpretative rules, for example, are particularly appropriate when the answers are unclear and experimentation is necessary, but
once answers emerge, the more concrete trade regulation rule could finalize
the positive results of the experiments.
The FTC should consciously select from among its tools the most costeffective law enforcement vehicle. Certain recent problem areas, for example,
might have been better handled by a more sophisticated use of all the agency's
regulatory tools. Instead of starting with a trade regulation rule in children's
advertising, for example, the FTC might have started with broadly written
interpretative rules developed either through negotiation or public participation. By now, it would have received information about the impact of its regulatory scheme with which to promulgate the legislative rules it proposed in a
relative vacuum years ago. It might have identified areas in which it cannot
regulate, areas in which industry cooperation is the only hope, areas in which
only soft direction from the government can work, and areas in which concrete
prescriptions are needed. It might even have identified certain segments of the
industry that could not have been dealt with through rulemaking but needed
the direct action of class adjudication. Instead, it started too quickly to regulate practices it did not understand; it ended in an unsuccessful rulemaking
173. Organization, Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.6, 2.7 (1982).
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effort. For this type of reckless action the FTC is criticized, and justifiably so,
for the FTC has the tools to proceed effectively with wisdom and patience. It
must endeavor to use its legislative rulemaking power sparingly, to the best
advantage of the marketplace. Nonetheless, a legislative rule is sometimes necessary. If used sparingly, the soundness of the agency's choice will be accepted
by business, albeit begrudgingly.
III.

CONCLUSION

The function of the FTC is to maintain a workable market economy. It
might do this by assuring that competitive market forces are free to work, and
by creating consumer confidence so that consumers unhesitatingly participate
in the market. The FTC has deviated from market maintenance goals, moving
instead toward a moralistic regulation of market performance. Criticism for
this misdirection should not be allowed to inhibit the agency's market maintenance function; it should not lead to a call, especially from the free market
enthusiasts, for less FTC activity. The true answer to these criticisms is a
sound FTC enforcement policy, but the FTC must be ever conscious of its
responsibility to keep the free market functioning effectively.
How can we assure that the FTC will take proper account of all the factors which make the market work to the benefit of all elements of society?
Trial-type devices are too myopic to foster that goal; they only result in delay
and narrowly focused decisions. The solution lies in a rulemaking procedure
that concentrates on broad fact gathering and the development of general policy goals.
Why has rulemaking failed at the FTC? A major cause is the FTC's insensitivity to the societal value of business activities. The FTC has failed to
incorporate business interests into its decision-making processes. Adverse impact on an industry necessarily results in an adverse impact on consumers. All
the interests under the care of the FTC have been disserved by its adversarial
attitude toward commercial interests.
It is clear that this insensitivity cannot be attributed to lack of input by the
target industries. The records in FTC trade regulation rulemaking proceedings are dominated by industry submissions and testimony. It is, therefore,
not the absence of opportunity, but the absence of impact on the decisions that
created the problem. The answer to this problem is to use an informal process
that results in a rule negotiated between the FTC, representatives of consumer
interests, and commercial interests. This negotiation will create a more workable rule that has the advantages not only of assuring optimurm market performance, but alo of retaining industry aquiescence, even if reluctantly
acquired. Indeed, for number of years the FTC used exactly such a process.
Rulemaking by negotiation should be reinstituted and should dominate FTC
process. Other broad regulatory tools--interpretative or legislative rules made
through public participation and class adjudication--should be built around
this device.

